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Abstract 
 
 
The adverse consequences for human rights caused by the availability and misuse of small arms 
have been highlighted by many studies. This research sees it as a matter cutting across three differ-
ent policy sectors of the EU: notably the promotion of human rights in its foreign policy, the con-
trol of arms exports, and the EU actions against the proliferation of small arms.  
The EU has recently developed an important framework in order to avoid exports of arms that are 
likely to be used in violating human rights, the main instrument being criterion 2 of the 1998 Code 
of Conduct on Arms Exports. And yet, European countries are in fact among the biggest producers 
and exporters of arms, including of small arms and light weapons. The question is, therefore, how 
does and how should the EU deal with this delicate equilibrium? Has the Code had an impact in 
curbing the export of small arms to countries which violate human rights? Is the current small arms 
export control mechanism adequate to support the EU promotion of democracy and human rights? 
Through the analysis of the exports from Belgium, Germany and Italy to thirteen countries selected 
on the basis of their very low human rights records, this study concludes that criterion 2 of the 
Code has not been effective.  It goes on to explain this conclusion by highlighting the lack of coor-
dination between arms export controls and other EU’s policies,  as well as the prevalence of other 
intervening factors, e.g. commercial and strategic interests, over human rights concerns.  
Acknowledging that the contradiction deriving from this situation may seriously undermine the 
commitment of the EU in the field of human rights, this study calls for a reform of the exports con-
trol and gives recommendations in order to address the most urgent loopholes. 
 
Keywords: arms export, small arms, European Union, human rights. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Unfortunately, no great stretch of the imagination is necessary to comprehend the adverse impact 
that the misuse of small arms can have on human rights. Small arms are the most common “tool” 
for extrajudicial and political killings, and they can be used to intimidate, rape, torture, arbitrarily 
arrest, forcibly return children as combatant, or force people to flee their homes1. An Amnesty In-
ternational document from 2001, for instance, reported that in at least 100 states, governments and 
non-state armed forces were using small arms and light weapons to abuse human rights2. But the 
impact of small arms on human rights goes beyond the threat of bodily harm alone. Small arms can 
indirectly violate a far wider range of rights: from the freedoms of assembly, association, move-
ment, thought, speech and participation in government, to the right to education and other social, 
economic and cultural rights3. 
In this scenario, the global weapons trade supplies small arms to many governments that use them 
to repress their own population. Obviously it is difficult to establish an empirical link between con-
crete human rights violations and the transfer and trade of arms. Nevertheless, some positive at-
tempts in this direction have emerged in scholarly literature. Blanton found that the import of arms 
in a country appears “to contribute to repression by making violent political acts more feasible” and 
may play “a direct instrumental role in the infliction of human rights abuse”4. 
The largest part of this trade is legal. That is, it is carried out by governments or their authorized 
agents in accordance with both international and national laws. In fact, although small arms have 
been recently referred to as the “weapons of mass destruction of the poor,”5 there is not yet a non-
proliferation regime for them akin to those for chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. In other 
words, at the international level there are no provisions which address the danger of transfer of 
small arms to governments which do – or may – use them to repress their own population and to 
abuse fundamental rights.  
In this context the European Union shows itself as partly changing the rules. Based on its norma-
tive concern for human rights, the EU has developed a framework in order to stop those exports 
which may endanger human rights in the recipient countries. For this very reason, the respect of 
human rights in the country of destination of European exports of arms – thus also of small arms – 
has been included among the criteria of the 1998 EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. In the 
meantime the EU also developed a specific policy on small arms which intends to address the prob-
lem of their proliferation, focusing primarily on capacity-building programmes directed to helping 
third countries enhance the control over their spread. 
Yet this theoretical framework faces several real challenges. On the one hand, European countries 
are among the largest producers and exporters of arms, including of small arms and light weapons. 
Economic interests, both national and European, drive against the noble aim of a high profile pol-
icy on human rights. But trade and business are not the only challenge to a genuine implementation 
of the Code of Conduct. Arms exports have always been considered a strategic tool of foreign pol-
icy and states are still reluctant to restrict their own freedom in this regard. Finally, while the EU 
seems to have adopted new rules, it still has to play a game in which the others – the United States, 
Russia and China above all – are jealous of the old rules and ready to cheat. 
                                                     
1  International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Unregulated arms availability, small arms & light weapons, and 
the UN process, Background paper, available on http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/small-arms-paper-
250506 (consulted on 10 July 2007) 
2  Amnesty International, Human Rights abuses with small arms, Illustrative cases from Amnesty International re-
ports 2000-2001, AI Index: POL 34/007/2001, 9 July 2001, available on http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ 
ENGPOL340072001?open&of=ENG-390 (consulted on 10 July 2007). 
3  UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, ‘Prevention of human rights violations 
committed with small arms and light weapons’, Preliminary report submitted by Barbara Frey, Special Rapporteur. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/29, 25 June 2003, chapter III. 
4  Blanton, 1999, p. 241. 
5  European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention’, Brussels, 11 April 2001, 
COM(2001) 211 final, p. 19. Also the former Secretary General of the United Nations stated that they “could well 
be described as weapons of mass destruction”, Annan, ‘Millennium Report of the Secretary General of the United 
Nations’, chapter 3, p. 52. Available via http://www.un.org/millennium/sg/report/ch3.pdf (consulted on 08 July 
2007). 
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The question  remains, how does and how should the EU deal with this delicate equilibrium be-
tween having a peculiar commitment in the field of human rights and traditional foreign policy 
interests which conflict with it. In other words, how do idealist issues find application in what has 
always been the realm of realism? To what extent can processes of Europeanisation highly in-
formed by human rights concern “be expected to impact on member state behaviour in key areas of 
foreign and security policy”6? 
Although this problem goes far beyond the matter of arms export controls, the area of small arms 
exports does seem to be an appealing avenue of inquiry. The contradictions described above dem-
onstrate the differences between the EU and the other players and they allow one to evaluate how 
closely EU rhetoric approaches reality.  
Tracing this line of analysis, the paper addresses the following concrete questions: has the Code 
had an effect in reducing exports of small arms to countries which violate human rights? To what 
extent do the small arms export policies of member states reflect the EU normative concern for 
human rights and democracy? Is the current small arms export control mechanism adequate to sup-
port the EU promotion of democracy and human rights? 
This paper is the result of research corresponding to my Master’s Thesis during the period of study 
spent at IFSH within its program for the EIUC European Master’s Degree in Human Rights and 
Democratisation. The integral version of the Thesis will be published in Italy with the title ‘Assess-
ing the European Control of Small Arms Exports in the light of the EU’s promotion of democracy 
and human rights: reality vs. rhetoric’, in E.MA Awarded Theses for the academic year 2006/2007, 
Ricerche, MARSILIO EDITORI, forthcoming ‘08.  
I warmly thank the IFSH and in particular Prof. Dr Michael Bzroska for the attention and interest 
he showed to me. A sincere acknowledgment to Prof. Dr Barbara Frey, Ernst Guelcher, Luisa Mor-
gantini, Prof. Raul Romeva Rueda and Sara Depaw for their valuable comments. Thanks also to 
Jiska Eelen for her precious help in the regression analysis. Finally, my most genuine gratitude 
goes to my friend Mathias Vermeulen, who indirectly contributed to the realisation of this study. 
                                                     
6  Bromley, Brzoska, 2007.  
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2. Methodology of the Research  
 
The study of small arms presents many methodological challenges. The lack of a univocal defini-
tion of small arms and the insufficient availability of data are at the same time substantial obstacles 
for research and a clear indicator of the limited interest among governments and institutions to 
address small arms proliferation with clarity and rigor. Unfortunately, even though the EU has 
shown a strong commitment with regards to arms exports controls, it is still very far from providing 
exhaustive data and coherent information. Therefore, a proper approach to the matter requires care-
ful methodological choices. 
First, a cogent definition of small arms is severely lacking. For both methodological and practical 
reasons, constructing such a definition is a necessary preliminary step to further analysis: depend-
ing on the range of equipment that one looks at, in fact, the results can differ significantly.  
In the 1998 Joint Action on small arms, the EU limited the definition to weapons designed for mili-
tary use7. Similarly, the scope of the Code of Conduct on Arms Exports is limited only to the mili-
tary equipment listed in the Common Military List (CML, infra, § 3.2.4). At international level, 
instead, a broader definition was adopted by the 1997 Report of the UN Panel of Governmental 
Experts on Small Arms. It included all lethal weapons designed for personal use or for use by sev-
eral persons serving as a crew8. In this definition human rights and humanitarian organisations have 
seen fit to include commercial firearms into the range of small arms as well. They argue that viola-
tions of human rights are not limited to the misuse of military equipment – a perspective also en-
dorsed by the UN Special Rapporteur on the prevention of human rights violations with small arms 
and light weapons9, and by most of the research programmes working on this issue. 
A main concern regarding the EU definition is the exclusion of the equipment used by police 
agents and private security companies. This exclusion weakens control over a wide range of 
equipment that may be used to violate human rights and repress the population. Therefore, I de-
cided to use a broad definition of small arms which is substantially in line with the 1997 UN Panel 
and many human rights NGOs, and yet not so broad as to include sporting or hunting equipment as 
suggested by some of them. 
Operative definition of small arms 
Small arms and light weapons are all weapons, employable by an individual person or a unit of 
people serving as a crew, which are designed or modified for the purpose of lethal use or repres-
sion, including non-military and security equipment, but excluding equipment for sporting and 
hunting purposes.  
While adopting a definition tightly bound to the 1998 EU Joint Action and to the Common Military 
List would make the analysis more consistent with the institutional framework in focus, the pur-
pose of this study is to carefully explore the origin of the violations of human rights arising from 
the (mis)use of small arms. One cannot expect the Code to effectively control a broader range of 
                                                     
7  Council of the European Union, ‘Joint Action on the European Union’s contribution to combating the destabilising 
accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons’, 17 December 1998 (1999/34/CFSP).1999/34/CFSP. 
The Joint Action defines “(a) Small arms and accessories specially designed for military use: 
- machine-guns (including heavy machine-guns),  
- submachine-guns, including machine pistols,  
- fully automatic rifles,  
- semi-automatic rifles, if developed and/or introduced as a model for an armed force,  
- moderators (silencers).  
(b) Man or crew-portable light weapons: 
- cannon (including automatic cannon), howitzers and mortars of less than 100 mm calibre,  
- grenade launchers,  
- anti-tank weapons, recoilless guns (shoulder-fired rockets),  
- anti-tank missiles and launchers,  
 - anti-aircraft missiles/man-portable air defence systems (Manpads)”. 
8  United Nations document, A/52/298, 27 August 1997, par. 23-26. 
9  UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/29, 25 June 2003, 
par. 4-16. 
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items than it actually mandates. And yet, limiting the scope of the analysis only to the 1998 defini-
tion would underestimate the danger for human rights created by the EU definition itself, attempt-
ing to solve on paper a contradiction that is rather significant in reality. 
This research looks at the exports of small arms from three European countries (Belgium, Ger-
many, and Italy) to thirteen recipients (Algeria, Belarus, Cameroon, Egypt, Iran, Kazakhstan, 
Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Vietnam). The choice 
of analyzing the exports of Belgium, Germany and Italy was determined mainly by the volume of 
their exports of small arms and the variety of their national legal framework concerning arms ex-
ports. These three countries indeed not only present an interesting mix of different national back-
grounds and different dimensions of the defence industry, but they also comprise the three largest 
exporters of small arms for almost the whole period taken into consideration10.  
The 13 recipient countries were selected on the basis of their very low human rights scores with the 
purpose to identify the recipients among the worst violators of human rights. Thus, EU member 
states would not have reason to doubt about the severity of the violations reported. Both physical 
integrity rights and civil and political rights have been considered directly according to the text of 
criterion 2 of the Code which makes explicit reference to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR)11 as well.  
I use two different codes concerning the physical integrity rights (the Political Terror Scale, or 
PTS, and the Cingranelli-Richards scale, or CIRI) and two codes for the civil and political rights 
(the Freedom House scale, or FH and Polity IV scale), having considered that each of them applies 
different criteria in scoring the respect of human rights and focuses on different kinds of violations. 
In particular, the PTS12 scores the level of respect/violation of personal integrity rights according to 
the description given both in the US State Department Country Reports and in the Amnesty Inter-
national Annual Reports on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 representing secure rule of law, people are not im-
prisoned for their views and torture is rare or exceptional; a 5 indicating that murders, disappear-
ances, and torture are a common part of life for the whole population). The two independent scores 
are added, and the final score ranges from 2 (best respect for human rights) to 10 (highest level of 
violation). 
The CIRI scale, proposed by Cingranelli and Richards13, uses the same sources of information but 
distinguishes four different categories of personal integrity rights (torture, political imprisonment, 
extrajudicial killings and disappearances) and gives a score from 0 to 2 for each of them. The final 
score ranges from 0 (highest level of violations) to 8 (best practices).  
The Freedom House scale14 is based on a very wide assortment of sources15 and gives two different 
sets of scores from 1 (best practices) to 7 (highest level of violation) for both civil liberties and 
political rights.  
The Polity IV16 scale combines multiple historical sources for each country with reference to a 
variety of standard sources and considers a wide set of variables to score the level of authority and 
democracy, in a range from -10 (highest level of authority) to +10 (highest level of democracy).  
                                                     
10  Small Arms Survey 2003, p. 103, Small Arms Survey 2004, pp. 103-104, Small Arms Survey 2005, pp. 102-105, 
International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), ‘2006: Bringing the global gun crisis under control’, 2006, 
p.5, available on http://www.iansa.org/members/IANSA-media-briefing-low-res.pdf (consulted on 10 July 2007). 
11  Criterion 2, Code of Conduct: “(…) and other major violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms as set 
out in relevant international human rights instruments, including the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”. See also Bromley and Brzoska, 2007.  
12  Gibney, 2004, Political Terror Scale 1980-2005, available on http://www.unca.edu/politicalscience/DOCS/ Gib-
ney/Political%20Terror%20Scale%201980-2005, (consulted on 20 March 2007). 
13  Cingranelli and Richards, 1999, and available on http://ciri.binghamton.edu/index.asp. (consulted on 07 May 2007). 
The scale partly considers civil and political rights too, but only the scores of physical and integrity rights have 
been used.  
14  Available online via http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15&year=2005. (Last accession 07 May 
2007). 
15  The complete list is available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=351&ana_page=336&year= 
2007, (consulted on 05 July 2007). 
16  Available online via http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity. (Last accession 07 May 2007). 
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The information gathered from these four codes had been combined in a database where the scores 
for all 151 recipient countries17 for the period 1998-200518 were reported. To assure a proper com-
parability, each scale has been transformed into a percentage scale, whereby a score of 0% indi-
cated the highest level of human rights violations and 100% was a sign of the full respect for hu-
man rights. Countries with at least three scores below 40% in all the years of the model have been 
isolated as the most problematic. 35 countries resulted from this selection. Among them, those 
under EU embargo have been excluded19 in order to avoid skewing the data. Finally a further selec-
tion required a consistent import of small arms in the first year of the timescale20, a variety in the 
geographical distribution of the countries, and differences in the level of economic and political 
relations with the EU.  
Algeria, Belarus, Cameroon, Egypt, Iran, Kazakhstan, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, 
United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Vietnam resulted to be the most significant countries in this 
regard. 
The analysis assumes that the data about the export of small arms reflect the choices of the Euro-
pean policy-makers. Necessarily, this supposes that the many other conditions that may influence 
the exports, in particular from the demand side, have not changed during the period considered. 
Although this is a strong assumption, that the number of licences for small arms issued by the 
European countries has been rather stable in the last years suggests that the demand, at least in gen-
eral terms, did not change significantly21. 
The most significant indicators under scrutiny are the relative trend and total monetary value22 of 
exports to the countries of concern, both aggregated and disaggregated for each one of the export-
ers observed. If the given assumptions hold, the effect of Code should appear as a distinguishable 
decrease in the exports to all (or most of) the countries of concern during the period. The trend for 
each one of the exporters, moreover, allows to detect, if any, different implementation of the Code 
at a national level.  
The volume of export, that is the number of weapons or ammunition exported, is not considered 
because the data available is very scarce. Similarly, the number of licence denials motivated by a 
reference to criterion 2 is not considered sufficiently significant. The data for license denials is both 
scarce and somewhat biased because in most cases a company that can foresee refusal simply will 
not submit the application for the licence.  
Finally, while acknowledging that a better understanding of the effect of the Code would be as-
sured by extending the analysis to the period previous to its adoption, the scarcity of data for the 
years earlier than 1998 prompted limiting the timescale to the period 1998-2006. I assume, there-
fore, that the exports in 1998 still reflect the pre-Code trend. 
The lack of data about small arms exports has been so far the main obstacle for scholars who 
wanted to study this subject, and finding a proper way to research on it has been the main challenge 
of this study from the methodological point of view. Indeed, while data about conventional arms 
are generally more exhaustive, data about small arms exports are very poor and this – considering 
that small arms are the most common tools of repression – is extremely critical from a human 
rights perspective. 
                                                     
17  They are all the countries that were importing small arms from the EU in 1998 – including those countries that had 
no imports in 1998, but had imports in 1997 and 1999. The information was extracted from the NISAT database. 
The database is available online via http://www.nisat.org. (consulted on 24 March 2007). 
18  For the year 2005 the availability is partial.  
19  Afghanistan, China, DRC, Eritrea, Iraq, Libya, Myanmar, Somalia, Sudan, Zimbabwe. North Korea and Uzbekistan 
are considered as not under embargo since the embargo started too recently to be reflected on the data about arms 
trade.  
20  This information was extracted from the NISAT database. Angola, Bhutan, Burundi, Cuba, Equatorial Guinea, 
Laos, North Korea, Rwanda, Syria, Turkmenistan were excluded on the basis of this criterion. 
21  The information about licences of small arms is available only since 2003 and refers to the categories ML1-ML3 of 
the Common Military List. In 2003 the licences issued were 7760, in 2004 they were 7054, in 2005 they were 7353. 
Source: Sixth, Seventh and Eight Annual Report on the implementation of the Code of Conduct, years 2004, 2005, 
2006. 
22  All values are in current prices. 
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Whereas the primary point of reference to assess the effectiveness of the Code should be the EU 
Annual Report on the implementation of the Code, this resource is short of exhaustive data on 
small arms. First, only a few countries provide categorized data broken down by type and recipient 
at the same time (among them Germany, but neither Belgium nor Italy). And, those who do so only 
started recently. Second, the Report classifies the exports according to the categories of the Com-
mon Military List. The CML, however, does not have a specific category for all types of small 
arms. The only option, then, is to look at the aggregate figure of the categories ML1-ML3 of the 
CML, even though they do not merge completely with the definition of the EU itself nor with the 
one adopted by this study.  
Although generally richer in information, the national reports on arms export suffer from the same 
lack of data existing in the EU report. Italy and Belgium do not categorize their data and Germany 
only began to provide a specific section of its report containing data about export of small arms 
disaggregated by recipient countries in 2002. Another option often used in studies dealing with 
arms export policies23, the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, is not appropriate for this study be-
cause it does not include data about small arms. 
Studies that have been looking at the trend in small arms exports24, therefore, have mostly relied on 
other sources of information such as national customs data, the UN Comtrade25 or the Eurostat 
External Trade (COMEXT) database26. Paradoxically, as it has been said, national export reports, 
which are published for reasons of transparency, are less transparent than international customs 
data once one considers small arms transfers27. UN Comtrade and Eurostat Database are in fact the 
two main sources of the NISAT database already used for the selection of the recipient countries.  
It is necessary to acknowledge that Eurostat data, as well as the other national and international 
custom data, differ significantly from arms export reports. First, the information collected does not 
merge with the categories considered by the Code. In particular, the three countries do not report 
their military exports to customs services, which are the only equipment covered by the Code28. 
Furthermore, the transfers reported by customs are not necessarily referring to a sale, but rather 
instances of provisions for peacekeeping operations or transfers of arms for reparations as well29. 
Customs similarly do not provide with information about the end-user. That is, a transfer from Bel-
gium to Saudi Arabia does not always mean that the equipment ultimately remained in Saudi Ara-
bia. Some countries (as is the case of Belgium) even report a portion of their exports under a “con-
fidential trade” category, which does not disclose the nature of the item. Finally, customs provide 
information about effective deliveries while export reports mainly inform the value of licences 
granted. 
In recognition of the limitations of each one of the sources mentioned here, adopting an “integrated 
approach” which combines the information from each of them seems to be the best – if only partial 
– solution for these deficiencies. This integrative approach provides an able toolset which can then 
be integrated with the operative definition of small arms given above. In order to be as consistent as 
possible with this definition, some of the categories reported by Eurostat (and their corresponding 
categories in the UN Comtrade) were not included in this analysis. In contrast with other more 
expansive studies30, I excluded the categories that referred to sporting and hunting rifles (930310, 
930320, 930330, 9303S8, 930521, 930529) and the category 9307 (swards, lances, bayonets).  
The categories considered are the following: 930100 (military weapons, incl. sub-machine guns - 
excl. revolvers and pistols of heading 9302); 930200 (revolvers and pistols - excl. those of heading 
9030 and 9040 and submachine guns for military purposes); 930400 (spring, air or gas guns and 
pistols, truncheons, and other non firearms - excl. 9307); 930510 (part and accessories for revolvers 
                                                     
23  Bromley, Brzoska, 2007. 
24  Jackson, Marsh, Thurin, 2005, Lagrasta, 2005, Holm, 2006, Small Arms Survey. 
25  Available via: www.comtrade.un.org.  
26  Available via: http://fd.comext.eurostat.cec.eu.int/xtweb/mainxtnet.do.  
27  Small Arms Survey, 2004, p. 101. 
28  A partial solution to track flows of military equipment from customs data is to look at the UN Comtrade import 
statistics of the countries of concern. When possible, this is applied in the next chapter. 
29  Small Arms Survey, 2004, p. 101. 
30  Small Arms Survey, 2004, Jackson, Marsh, Thurin, 2005. 
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or pistols, N.E.S.); 930590 (part and accessories for weapons of the headings 9301, 9303, 9304); 
930621 (cartridges for smooth-barrelled shotguns); 930629 (parts of cartridges for smooth-
barrelled shotguns; lead shot for air rifles and pistols); 930630 (parts of cartridges and parts thereof 
for smooth-barrelled shotguns, revolvers and pistols); 930690 (bombs, grenades, torpedos, mines, 
missiles and other ammunitions and projectiles, and parts thereof): 93SSS8 and 93SSS9 (Confiden-
tial trade of Chapter 93) 
 
 
3.  The EU’s Approach to the Exports Control of Small Arms to Countries which Violate 
Human Rights: A Target Across Three Policies 
 
The European Union stands out, in the context of the global trade in small arms, for its advanced 
framework to address the adverse consequences that its exports may have in foreign countries. 
Among other concerns, the respect of human rights plays a prominent role in the institutionalisation 
of criterion 2 of the 1998 Code of Conduct on Arms Export. This attention is the result of the 
unique place that human rights have found in the European foreign policy. Alongside with these 
developments, the EU has also elaborated a specific focus on small arms which found recent and 
more complete expression in the 2005 Strategy on small arms. 
Three policies – promotion of human rights, arms export control and combat against the prolifera-
tion of small arms – are the basis of the European commitment to curb the exports of small arms to 
countries which violate human rights. An overview of each is given here in order to highlight suffi-
cient information and instruments in order to assess the effectiveness of these efforts in the analysis 
to follow.  
 
3.1 The promotion of human rights in the EU external action 
The sustained attention of the EU on the promotion of human rights is often seen among scholars 
and in the EU’s own view as the feature which distinguishes it from other international actors. In 
addition to opting for the term “soft power” 31 or for others such as “normative power” or “civilian 
power”32 to refer to this peculiarity, there is wide agreement upon the fact that “the EU has gone 
further towards making its external relations informed by, and conditional on, a catalogue of norms 
which come closer to those of the European convention on human rights and fundamental freedoms 
(ECHR) and the universal declaration of human rights (UDHR) than most other actors in world 
politics”33. 
The centrality of human rights in foreign policy has also been considered one of the crucial ele-
ments of the emerging concept of “human security”34, an approach whereby the attention of the 
foreign policy shifts from the state to the individual35. Although to date the EU has not officially 
incorporated the term in its external action, several scholars consider this idea as already shaping 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)36. 
Human rights have been in fact increasingly incorporated in the official discourse of the EU. Pro-
gressively, the member states have placed the principles which underpinned their communal rela-
tions at the heart of their relation with the rest of the world37 so that “the promotion of human rights 
and democracy has become an extremely well integrated element of EU external relations pol-
icy”38. 
                                                     
31  Nye, 2002, p. 9. 
32  Manners, 2002, Sijursen, 2006.  
33  Manners, 2002, p. 241. 
34  Kaldor, Martin, Selchow, 2007, p. 283. 
35  Ehrhart, 2002, p. 23. 
36  Kotsopoulos, 2006, p. 8, Kaldor, Martin, Selchow, 2007, p. 274. Also the European Commissioner for External 
Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner referred to this concept as endorsed by the EU. See for instance Ferrero-
Waldner, 2005: “Human security stands at the basis of a modern foreign policy. (…) There can be no long term 
peace and global security without human security”. 
37  T. King, 1999, p. 314.   
38  Crawford, 2002, p. 911. 
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With the adoption of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) in 1992, human rights found their 
place in Art. 11 as one of the objectives of the new born CFSP39. Other mentions are found within 
the spheres of economical, financial, technical and development cooperation with third countries40 
as well. The positive and negative conditionality that the EU applies in its relations with third coun-
tries has been considered to be both the effect and the cause of human rights considerations applied 
to foreign policy-making41.  
The Union enforces human rights in its foreign policy through a whole set of tools. They range 
from simple declarations to more binding and concrete common strategies; common positions and 
joint action; from guidelines on specific human rights themes to dialogues with third countries on 
human rights; from the inclusion of human rights clauses in all sorts of agreements with external 
partners to the funding of projects through the European Initiative for Democratisation and Human 
Rights (EIDHR).  
All of these mechanisms exist at a different degree of implementation depending on the region 
concerned and are particularly forceful in the areas where the cooperation with the EU is stronger. 
Their role in the EU external policy towards some of the recipient countries considered by this 
paper will be further explored in chapter 5. 
The complexity of the institutional structure of the EU, the cross-pillar nature of some of the areas 
concerned and the number of actors involved, however, contribute to regular problems of coordina-
tion and coherency. It was precisely the concern to ensure that these different instruments were 
used coherently and effectively which moved the European Commission in 2001 to call for a main-
streaming of human rights42. This call was received by the Council Conclusions of 25 June 200143 
and fully answered by a document in June 2006 in which the Council recommends that all the ac-
tors involved make better use of the tools for raising human rights issue with foreign countries in 
order to achieve a more informed, credible, coherent and effective EU human rights policy44.  
Among all the sectors in which human rights have been progressively included, the attention will 
now focus on the arms export control policy developed by the EU.  
 
3.2 The increasing attention to human rights in the European control of arms export  
3.2.1 The 1990s and the first connections between human rights and arms exports 
Partly as a result of pressure from human rights and humanitarian NGOs documenting the human 
costs of irresponsible arms transfers45, European governments have grown increasingly aware of 
the link between arms exports and human rights violations since the early 1990s. Consequently, 
they have agreed to strengthen their coordination in developing responsible export policies.  
The first mention of human rights in connection with arms exports was in the Declaration on Non-
proliferation and Arms Exports issued by the European Council in 1991. The document enlisted 
seven criteria (an eighth criterion was added in 1992) that the member states should consider in 
                                                     
39  Treaty on the European Union, art. 11.1: “The Union shall define and implement a common foreign and security 
policy covering all areas of foreign and security policy, the objectives of which shall be: (…) to develop and con-
solidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms”. 
40  Idem, art. 177: “Community policy in this area shall contribute to the general objective of developing and consoli-
dating democracy and the rule of law, and to that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms”, and 181a 
(same provision). 
41  Gropas, 1999, p. 19. 
42  European Commission, ‘Communication on the European Union's Role in Promoting Human Rights and Democra-
tisation in Third Countries’, COM(2001) 252, final, Brussels, 08 May 2001. In the 2002 Annual Report on Human 
Rights of the European Union defines mainstreaming as “the process of integrating human rights into all aspects of 
policy decision making and implementation”. Mainstreaming, it is said, “can thus make a significant contribution to 
the coherence and consistency of the EU's handling of human rights in external relations”, p. 19. 
43  http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/human_rights/doc/gac_conc_06_01.htm. 
44  Council of the European Union, Mainstreaming human rights across CFSP and other EU policies, 10076/06, 7 June 
2006. 
45  Hughes, 2006. 
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shaping their export policies for all conventional weapons, and the criterion 2 referred to the re-
spect of human rights in the recipient country46.  
Although it was only a political declaration, it reflected a transformation that involved the whole 
defence sector following the end of the Cold War. Since the Treaty of Rome, the exports of arms 
had been left outside of the competencies of the Community, judging the matter to be too important 
for national security interests and for the concept of sovereignty itself 47. The same provision has 
been incorporated in the Treaty on the European Union in Art. 296 and it is still valid48. Even if 
arms export control initially had been left outside the effective reach of the EU, the increasing Eu-
ropeanization of the defence industry would have also required greater harmonisation in export 
policies49 just as civilian (and dual-use goods to some extent as well) began to be regulated after the 
launch of the European Common Market in 199250.  
More contingent factors also helped to determine this shift in the minds of European policy makers.  
In the 1991 Gulf War, European states experienced the “boomerang effect” of witnessing their own 
arms (which were previously supplied to Iraq) being employed in combat against European sol-
diers51. In this context, the campaigning by a group of NGOs for the adoption of an EU Code con-
tributed to bringing the issue under the spotlight of public discourse52.  
The Council consequently established in 1991 the Ad Hoc Working Group on Conventional Arms 
Exports (COARM) with the task of enhancing the implementation and progressive elaboration of 
the criteria enlisted in the Declaration of Non-proliferation. Since 1995, the European Parliament 
has been raising the issue of human rights with respect to arms export control in several resolutions 
adopted, calling for the approval of a code of conduct on arms exports and stressing the importance 
of such a document for preventing the flows of arms to countries which violate human rights53. In 
addition to the growing emphasis that the CFSP was placing on conflict prevention54, committing 
to responsibility concerning arms exports was increasingly considered a powerful complement to 
the efforts in tackling illicit arms trafficking as well55. 
 
3.2.2 The 1998 Code of Conduct on Arms Exports 
A Franco-British proposal was the starting point for the negotiation between different national 
positions, intergovernmental interests and NGO pressures which led to the adoption of the Code of 
Conduct on Arms Export (the Code) in 199856. As Bauer says: “The EU Code was, and continues 
to be, promoted by a coalition of interests whose members pursue differing or even contradictory 
objectives and priorities but share the common aim of harmonising arms export policies”57. 
The Code covers the exports of all conventional weapons. Formally speaking, it is a Council Decla-
ration agreed in the context of the CFSP. Therefore, it entails a political commitment at the inter-
                                                     
46  European Council, ‘Declaration on Non-proliferation and Arms Exports’, Luxembourg, June 1991 and European 
Council, ‘Additional Criteria’, Lisbon, June 1992, both available at http://projects.sipri.se/expcon/eu_docu-
ments.html (acceded 27 April 2007). 
47  Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, art. 223. 
48  Art. 296 (1) of the TEU states: “(..) : (a) no Member State shall be obliged to supply information the disclosure of 
which it considers contrary to the essential interests of its security; (b) any Member State may take such measures 
as it considers necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security which are connected with the 
production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material; (…)”. 
49  Bauer, 2004(a), pp. 130-131, Bromley and Brzoska, 2007, (unpublished manuscript). 
50  Bauer and Bromley, 2004, p. 3. 
51  Bromley and Brzoska, 2007, and Bauer, 2004(a), p. 131.  
52  Bauer, 2004(a) p. 131, Holm, 2006, p. 213, UNESCO Chair on Peace and Human Rights, 1998. 
53  European Parliament, Resolution of 20 February 1995, (OJ, C 43, pp. 89-90), ‘Resolutions on a code of conduct on 
arms exports’ of 15 January 1998 (OJ C 34, 2 February 1998, pp. 163-64) and 14 May 1998 (OJ C 167, 1 June 
1998, pp. 226-27), Joint ACP-EU Assembly Resolution on the code of conduct on arms exports, anti-personnel 
mines and the Ottawa process of 21 of march 1998. 
54  Ehrhart, 2002, p. 33. 
55  Council of the European Union, ‘Common position on conflict prevention and resolution in Africa’, Decision 
97/356/CFSP.OJL 153/1997. 
56  For a more detailed report of the negotiation process of the Code see Bauer, 2004(b), pp. 32-34, Davis, 2002, pp. 
83-110, and UNESCO, 1998. 
57  Bauer, 2004(b), p. 34. 
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governmental level but it is neither legally binding nor enforceable by the European Court of Jus-
tice (ECJ)58. It is however the first agreement reached among the members of the EU in the field of 
conventional arms trade, and it is considered to be the most sophisticated and effective multilateral 
arms export control instrument in the world59. Some member states have entirely (Belgium) or 
partly (Austria, Finland, UK, Germany) adapted their national arms export legislation to the provi-
sions of the Code60. It is however still debated to what extent the Code has led to a better harmoni-
sation of the different legal systems.  
Looking closer to the case of the three exporter countries considered by this study, Germany had 
already implemented strict controls on the export licences before the adoption of the Code. Since 
the “Weapons of War Control Act and the Foreign Trade and Payments Act” of 1961 the govern-
ment is legally obliged to deny a permit if it can constitute a threat to peace or may be not in accor-
dance with German responsibilities under international law61. “Political principles for the export of 
weapons” were established in 1971 and included a listing of countries of special concern62. In 2000, 
the criteria of the EU Code of Conduct were integrated in the “political principles”, with a particu-
lar emphasis on the respect of human rights in the countries of destination and end-use63.  
The 1990 adoption of the Law No. 185 in Italy, defined by Amnesty International as a model on the 
international level for the importance that it attributes to the respect of human rights64,  somewhat 
anticipated the debate that took place at the European level later in the 1990s. The law forbids, 
among other activities, any export of arms to countries where the government is responsible of 
gross violation of human rights (Art. 1 par. 6d)65. Moreover the law introduces a very strict control 
over end-users and obliges the government to submit yearly a very detailed report to the parlia-
ment. In 2007, a list of countries of special concern for their human rights situation was included in 
the export report. Nonetheless the Italian law only applies to a restrictive category of military 
equipment66, leaving all non-military weapons, which constitutes the 80% of Italian export of small 
arms67, completely unregulated. It has been noted that the Code had a positive effect in this regard 
because, although it does not cover a number of non-military items, it is more comprehensive than 
the Italian law. As a result, the Ministries of Foreign and Internal Affairs have started evaluating 
the compatibility of some civilian arms exports with the Common Military List68.  
While traditionally Belgium has been regarded as a weak link in the implementation of export con-
trols, since 2003 it has transposed the Code into Belgian law, thus giving to the eight criteria a 
binding value on a national level69. This move was partly a reaction to the scandal of the previous 
year when the Belgian government authorised an export of 5500 FN Herstal light machine guns to 
Nepal after Germany had denied the licence due to the widespread violations of human rights and 
the instability of the country70. Some doubt, however, has been cast on the validity of the new law 
due to a further reform introduced by the special law of 12 August 2003. This reform shifts respon-
                                                     
58  See art. 46 of the Treaty on the European Union. 
59  UNIDIR, 2005, p. 23. 
60  Anders, 2003, p. 5. Bauer, 2004(b), p. 35. 
61  Davis, 2002, p. 163. 
62  In 2002 Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Lebanon, Libya, 
Myanmar, Somalia, Syria and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. See Davis, 2002, note 45, p. 168. 
63  Davis, 2002, pp. 169-172. 
64  Amnesty International Italia, ‘Comunicato Stampa sul disegno di legge 1927’, available via: http://lists.peacelink.it/ 
news/msg01988.html (consulted on 23 May 2007). 
65  Legge 09/07/1990 n. 185, ‘Nuove norme sul controllo dell’esportazione, importazione e transito dei materiali di 
armamento, in Gazz. Uff., 14 luglio, n. 163. 
66  Legge 09/07/1990 n. 185, ‘Nuove norme sul controllo dell’esportazione, importazione e transito dei materiali di 
armamento, in Gazz. Uff., 14 luglio, n. 163, art. 1 par. 11. 
67  Bonaiuti, 2001, p. 103. 
68  Holm, 2002, p. 223. See also Camera dei Deputati, ‘Relazione sulle operazioni autorizzate e svolte per il controllo 
dell’esportazione, importazione e transito dei materiali di armamento nonché dell’esportazione e del transito dei 
prodotti ad alta tecnologia (anno 2002)’, 27 marzo 2003, p. 29.  
69  Chambre des Représentants de Belgique, ‘Loi modifiant la loi du 5 août 1991 relative à l'importation, à l'exporta-
tion, au transit et à la lutte contre le trafic d'armes, de munitions et de matériel devant servir spécialement à un 
usage militaire et de la technologie y afférente, 26 Mars 2003. (GRIP Data, available on www.grip.org, consulted 
on 10 July 2007). 
70  BBC News, 26 August 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/2216446.stm (consulted on 23 May 2003). 
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sibility in the application of the export controls from federal to regional authorities. Unfortunately, 
none of the three regions has yet transformed the criteria into a positive legal norm71. 
Overall, the effect of the Code in harmonising the different legal systems also depends on the crite-
rion considered. With regard to criterion 2, Bromley and Brzoska conclude that “there has been no 
increase in harmonization with respect to arms exports to countries deemed problematic according 
to their PTS score”72. Conversely Holm finds that a collateral effect of the Code was a drive to a 
lowest common denominator: loosening the export controls where they were stricter and a 
strengthening were they were loose73.  
Beyond national legislative frameworks, other binding documents such as the 2000 Framework 
Agreement74 and the 2000 Council Regulation on export of dual-use goods75 give the Code limited 
legal status by making reference to the Code as one criterion to be followed for exports of the 
equipments falling under their provisions.76 As Bauer writes, the Code has become a policy coordi-
nation tool far beyond its scope as a result “of both an unintended ‘spillover’, and a deliberate strat-
egy to develop the Code without revising the document but rather create the political equivalent of 
‘case law’. This means that new norms emerge from current practice, rather than vice versa”77.  
Finally, issues excluded by the Code in 1998 – such as the harmonisation of end-use procedures, 
EU companies operating in third countries, and the problem of brokering – have been progressively 
discussed by COARM78. For instance, some agreement has been reached on core elements to be 
contained in end user certificates79, and the discussion led the Council to adopt a Common Position 
in the case of brokering80.  
 
3.2.3 The Criterion 2 of the Code 
An indirect mention to human rights is present already in the preamble of the Code81, but the clear-
est reference to the danger that arms exports create for human rights is its criterion 2. It states that 
“member states will (a) not issue an export licence if there is a clear risk that the proposed export 
might be used for internal repression; (b) exercise special caution (…) where serious violations of 
human rights have been established by the competent bodies of the UN, the Council of Europe or 
by the EU”82. Like the other criteria of the Code83, criterion 2 is built upon language already 
adopted in 1991 and 1992. It differs however in that the text is divided into two sub-categories of 
varying strength. The language of the former, which conditions issuance of an export license on 
recipient state behaviour, strikes a seemingly sharp chord. In only asking for special caution with 
regard to human rights violations, the second subsection rings rather flat.  
In fact, it is a problem which affects the whole Code, whereby two different categories can be dis-
tinguished across the eight criteria: for some of the provisions (1, 2a, 3, 4 when there is a “clear 
                                                     
71  Flemish Peace Institute, 2007, p. 69. 
72  Bromley, Brzoska, 2007. 
73  Holm, 2006, p. 231. 
74  The text of the treaty is available online via http://projects.sipri.se/expcon/loi/indrest01.htm (acceded 2 May 2007). 
75  See art. 8 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1334/2000 of 22 June 2000, OJ L 159 (30 June 2000) pp. 1-215 
76  Brzoska, 2004, p. 89; Bauer, 2004(a), p. 132. 
77  Bauer, 2004(b), p. 35. 
78  Bauer, 2004(a), p. 138. 
79  Anders, 2003, p. 5. 
80  Council of the European Union, ‘Common Position on the control of arms brokering, 23 June 2003, 2003/468/ 
CFSP. 
81  Council of the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, document 8675/2/98 Rev 2, Brussels, 5 June 
1998. Preamble: “Determined to prevent the export of equipment which might be used for internal repression”. 
82  Council of the European Union, European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, document 8675/2/98 Rev 2, 
Brussels, 5 June 1998, p. 4.  
83  The other criteria concern: (1) respect for the international commitments of member states, including international 
and EU embargoes and non-proliferation treaties, (3) the internal situation in the country of destination, (4) preser-
vation of international peace, security and stability, (5) the national security of the member states and of the allied 
countries, (6) the behaviour of the buyer with regard to the international community, (7) the risk of diversion or of 
re-export of the equipment from the buyer country and (8) the compatibility of arms export with the economic and 
technical development of the recipient country. 
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risk”), the Code makes obligatory for the state to deny a licence; for others (2b, 4a-d, 5, 6, 7, 8) it 
only requires consideration of the criteria before authorization of an export licence84. Furthermore, 
even in the case of criterion 2 (a) ( when the Code calls for a denial of the licence) much will de-
pend on the recognition of a “clear risk of internal repression”85. The text of the Code thus leaves 
wide room for interpretation with regard to the respect of human rights in the country of final des-
tination. Partly to address this problem, COARM has worked on the elaboration of a User’s Guide 
to the Code,86 which it published for the first time in 2003. In its latest update in 2006, the User’s 
Guide included also a section of “Best practices for the interpretation of criterion 287. 
According to the Best Practices, member states should consider on a case-by-case basis the current 
and past record with regard to respect for human rights of both the end-user and the recipient coun-
try in general. This includes the policy line of the government, the effective protection of human 
rights in the constitution, human rights training of law enforcement agencies, prosecution of human 
rights violations and the existence of independent monitoring bodies88. The Best Practices also give 
a list of indicators that should be taken into consideration in the assessment, including the imple-
mentation and ratification record of relevant international and regional human rights instruments89, 
the degree of cooperation with international and regional human rights mechanisms and the politi-
cal will to discuss domestic human rights issues in bilateral or multilateral dialogues like the ones 
held by the EU.   
After shedding light on the concept of interpretation of the term “serious” violation, the Best Prac-
tices address the aforementioned ambiguity of the term “clear risk”, noting that “the combination of 
‘clear risk’ and ‘might’ in the text (…) requires a lower burden of evidence than a clear risk that 
equipment will be used for internal repression”90. The final remarks implore states to properly con-
sider the nature of the equipments, the legitimate need of the end-user for specific equipment and 
the risk of diversion91.  
As it is still too early to determine if the adoption of this Best Practices will improve the implemen-
tation of criterion 2, it must be noted that this study focuses on a timeframe in which they were not 
yet adopted.  
 
3.2.4 The Operative Provisions and the Annual Reports 
The operative provisions comprise the second part of the Code and they are vitally linked to the 
Code’s efficacy. Because the Code is not a legally binding document, these operative provisions 
are effectively the primary means of enforcing the Code criteria92.  
The consultation mechanism as outlined by provision 3 obliges a member state to communicate the 
reason for the denial of a licence to the others. In particular, it requires any state that wants to au-
thorize an export within three years after a licence for the same transaction has been denied by 
another state to consult bilaterally93 with the latter. Eventually the state is free to grant the licence, 
but it is clear that “the consultation mechanism means that an undercut carries a political price, and 
has thus added political costs to be factored into the decision-making”94.  
                                                     
84  Bauer, 2004(a), pp.133-134. 
85  Holm, 2006, p. 214. 
86  Council of the European Union, ‘User’s Guide to the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports’, updated version, 
Brussels, 18 December 2006, 16440/06. 
87  Calls in this directions were present, for instance, in the Seventh annual report, (2005/C 328/01), p. 4. 
88  Ibid., p. 25. 
89  A list of the main international and regional human rights instruments the member states should consider is in-
cluded as an annex to the Guide (p. 31-32). 
90  Ibid., p. 27. 
91  Ibid, p. 28. 
92  Holm, 2006, p. 215. 
93  Since 2000 the member states agreed to share ‘information on the undercut decision not only (as specified in the 
operative provisions) with the State responsible for the relevant denial, but, in the context of COARM delibera-
tions, with all Member States’. See Council of the European Union, ‘Third Annual Report according to operative 
provision 8 of the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports’, OJ C 351 (11 December 2001), p.4. 
94  Bauer, 2004(b), p. 41. The political price has been evident in the case concerning the export from Belgium to Nepal 
in 2002 to which we referred above, leading even a minister of the Belgian government, Magda Aelvoet, to resign.  
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In June 2000 the Council agreed on a Common Military List according to operative provision 5 to 
which the Code is applied and a separate list concerning dual-use items. However, although the aim 
of the CML was to reflect “current international security and human rights concerns”95 and not-
withstanding the calls from the EP not to limit to the lowest common denominator96, non-military 
security and police equipment were excluded from the List and therefore from the scope of the 
Code97. 
According to operative provision 8 the national reports on arms exports were meant to circulate 
only confidentially among the member states, but thanks in part to the pressure of the European 
Parliament, NGOs and the Finnish presidency, they have been collected under a consolidated ver-
sion publicly available since 199998. The Annual Report contains not only information about the 
amount of exports in all conventional arms, but it also mentions discussions, consultations and 
decisions held within the COARM. The quantity and the quality of the data included in the Annual 
Report have increased over the years. However, the document ultimately depends on the quality of 
the national reports themselves: the lack of uniformity in the national standards of reporting has 
created large amounts of muddled data that is not always comparable. The confusion has been pro-
gressively addressed99 and a measure of this improvement in the document is appreciable in that it 
has grown from the 4 pages in its first year to the 346 pages of the Eight Annual Report issued in 
October 2006. This progress aside however, as already discussed in the methodological remarks, 
the problem of data availability is far from being solved.  
A final mention should be reserved for operative provision 11, which states that European member 
states will encourage other arms exporters to subscribe to the principles of the Code. Besides the 
countries which entered the Union in 2004, for which adherence to the Code criteria was a sin qua 
non for accession, similar efforts have also been directed at other countries such as Turkey, Croatia 
and Canada100. In this light one can better appreciate the ‘Declaration by the European Union and 
the United States on the Responsibilities of States and on Transparency regarding Arms Exports’ of 
December 2000101 and other similar efforts undertaken in international fora102.  
 
3.2.5 The criticism about the effectiveness of the Code 
Notwithstanding the progress in European control of arms exports, concerns about the effectiveness 
of the Code with regards to human rights violations have been raised by several actors. Critics par-
ticularly stress the absence of legally binding measures.  
A 2004 report by Amnesty International found that EU weapons were being exported to countries 
where the EU standards for democracy and human rights were clearly not respected.103 In the same 
year, the European Parliament stressed that “EU human rights policies have been undermined by 
                                                     
95  Council of the European Union, ‘1st Annual Report in conformity with Operative Provision 8 of the European 
Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports’, 1999/C 315/01, p. 2. 
96  European Parliament, ‘Report on the Council’s 1999 Annual Report on the Implementation of the EU Code of 
Conduct on Arms Exports’, 18 July 2000, A5-0211/2000, p. 15. 
97  Since 2001 the Commission have been working on a proposal for a Community Regulation which would create a 
third list covering security and police equipment. See Council of the European Union, ‘Fourth Annual Report ac-
cording to operative provision 8 of the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports’, 11 November 2002, 
13779/02, p. 4. 
98  Bauer and Bromley, 2004, p. 5. 
99  Ibid., 2004, p. 5, Bauer, 2004(a), pp.141-143.  
100  See also Anders, 2003, p. 5, and Bauer, 2004(b) p. 41. 
101  Available on http://www.sipri.org/contents/expcon/euus2000.html/view?searchterm=european policies (consulted 
on 28 June 2007). 
102  For instance in the framework of the 2001 ‘UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons 
in All Its Aspects’: ‘Note verbal transmitting the text of the EU Plan of Action’, 28 December 2000, A/Conf. 
192/PC/21, Discussion paper, 27 July 2000, A/Conf. 182/PC/18, ‘Elements for consideration in the preparation for 
the Conference’, 10 March 2000, A/Conf. 182/PC/6. Important, also, have been the resolutions of the European 
Parliament promoting the negotiation of an Arms Trade Treaty: European Parliament,. ‘Resolution on small arms’, 
13 June 2002, OJ C 140 E, p. 587, Resolution of 19 March 2004,  OJ C 69 E, p. 136, Resolution of 26 May 2005,  
P6_TA(2005)0204 and Resolution of 21 June 2007, P6_TA-PROV(2007)0282. 
103  Amnesty International, Undermining Global Security: the European Union’s arms exports, 2004, Index AI: ACT 
30/003/2004, available on http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGACT300032004 (consulted on 10 July 2007). 
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(…) Member States systematically not maintaining a restrictive application of the EU Code of 
Conduct on Arms Exports”104. 
The European Parliament has also annually noted that a strict arms export control regime is critical 
to the fundamental principles underlying the EU’s external policy105. Calls to enforce the system 
with special attention to human rights have been present in all the European Parliament resolutions 
on the Annual Report. They press for more stringent controls, for legally binding provisions, and 
for greater transparency106. Similar proposals for the adoption of a legally binding document have 
come also from human rights NGOs.  
The major obstacles against such a progress are, however, worthy of note. First, a transformation of 
the Code into European law would require a revision of article 296 of the TEU, any radical change 
of which seems unlikely in the near future107. The transfer of such national prerogatives to suprana-
tional authorities can only be the last stage in a long evolutionary process preceded by various tran-
sitional stages.  Each attempt so far has produced protests from both industrial groups and from 
governments with a strong defence industrial base to protect108.  
Second, the question carries a strong political meaning which has been particularly emphasized by 
some countries. The clearest example in this sense has been the request forwarded by France that 
approval of a binding document be dependant on removal of the EU arms embargo to China109. 
The question thus remains quite far from resolution. It would appear that Bauer’s argument in 2004 
is still valid today: “At this point in time, a step-by-step integration of the criteria into national 
norms and laws may be more feasible than a transformation of the Code into European law”110. 
 
3.3 The EU and small arms: from the 1998 Joint Action until the 2005 Strategy 
While the arms export control policy of the EU does address the export of small arms among all 
other conventional weapons, a more specific policy focus on small arms has been developed by the 
EU since 1998. It aims at tackling both the proliferation and misuse of small arms on the one hand, 
as well as helping third countries in dealing with the problem on the other111.  
In 1998, a few months after the adoption of the Code, the first “Joint Action on the European Un-
ion’s contribution to combating the destabilising accumulation and spread of small arms and light 
weapons” was adopted. It owed much to the preceding 1997 “Programme for preventing and com-
bating the illicit trafficking in conventional arms”, which created a legally binding document while 
narrowing the scope of action only to small arms. The Action established the EU’s definition of 
small arms (supra, Chapter 2) and provided for financial and technical assistance (a) to combat the 
illicit trafficking into EU territories, (b) to provide capacity building in this sector to other coun-
tries, and (c) to develop measures to reduce the existing stockpiles of small arms112. Identical in the 
                                                     
104  European Parliament, ‘Resolution on human rights in the world in 2003 and the European Union's policy on the 
matter’, 22 April 2004, P5_TA(2004)0376, paragraph 30. 
105  For instance, European Parliament, ‘Report on the Council’s 1999 Annual Report on the Implementation of the EU 
Code of Conduct on Arms Exports’, 18 July 2000, A5-0211/2000, p. 12: “In the field of arms exports this consis-
tency [between protection of human rights in EU’s external action and EU’s commercial policy] cannot be said to 
exist fully, which weakens the CFSP and diminishes the credibility of a European Defence policy” 
106  The EP resolutions and reports on the Annual Report are available at http://www.nisat.org/EU/ Euro-
pean%20Parliament/European%20Parliament%20and%20Small%20Arms.htm (consulted on 10 July 2007). See al-
so D’argenzio, ‘Armi, l’Europarlamento vuole il Codice’, in Il Manifesto, 18 January 2007. 
107  Bauer, 2004(b), p. 39, Davis, 2002, p. 109. 
108  Davis, 2002, p. 110. 
109  “France blocking plan for EU code on arms exports”, 18 January 2007, www.euobserver.com (consulted on 20 
February 2007). 
110  Bauer, 2004(b), p. 39. 
111  European Commission, ‘Small arms and light weapons, The response of the European Union’, 2001, p. 7. 
112  Council of the European Union, ‘Joint Action on the European Union’s contribution to combating the destabilising 
accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons’, 17 December 1998 (1999/34/CFSP). Since 1998 eight-
een joint action concerning CFSP small arms programmes have been taken to start or continue programmes in vari-
ous countries and regions. For a complete list see UNIDIR, 2005, pp. 37-39. 
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objectives and structure, a successive Joint Action was adopted in 2002 with the purpose of includ-
ing ammunition in the scope of action113.  
It should be observed, however, that the concern for human rights is less evident in the EU policy 
on small arms than in the arms export control policy. While small arms are seen as a threat to secu-
rity and stability in third countries for their contribution to the outbreak of armed conflict, they are 
not explicitly acknowledged as a potential tool to violate human rights in peace time. This is re-
flected by the fact that the largest portion of small arms assistance programmes are implemented 
within clear frameworks for conflict resolution such as peace-building or Disarmament, Demobili-
sation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes in post-conflict situations114. 
Over the years small arms actions have in fact become a part of the broader conflict prevention 
policy and have been integrated into relevant cooperation frameworks. The EU Development 
Council, for instance, stressed in 1999 the importance of including the small arms issue in the po-
litical dialogue with African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) States and other development coopera-
tion partner countries of the EU115. Moreover, the mention of small arms in Art. 11 of the Cotonou 
Agreement made possible the launch of a number of projects relevant to controlling the illicit 
spread of small arms116.  The focus on conflict prevention became even clearer with the mention of 
small arms as the “weapons of mass destruction” of the poor in the 2001 European Commission 
communication on Conflict Prevention117. 
A better understanding of the means of effective policy on small arms was reached by the 2005 EU 
Small Arms Strategy, which aims at approaching the proliferation of small arms in all its aspects. 
The document stresses that any reactive strategy has to be supplemented by preventive actions 
which tackle the illegal arms supply and strengthen the controls on arms exports118. The strategy 
acknowledges that the control on exports requires a more comprehensive approach based “on the 
recognition, formulated in the ESS [European Security Strategy], that human security and human 
development are interdependent”119. 
Still, not even the Strategy considers the danger of small arms outside the context of conflict or 
post-conflict situations, and it reiterates the same understanding of small arms proposed by the 
Joint Actions120. Looking at the Strategy from the perspective of arms export controls, finally, it 
has to be noticed that it did not go far enough as to redress the limits that are contained in the 1998 
definition of small arms.  
                                                     
113  Council of the European Union, ‘Joint Action on the European Union’s contribution to combating the destabilising 
accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons and repealing Joint Action 1999/34/CFSP’, 12 July 2002 
(2002/589/CFSP). 
114  UNIDIR, 2005, pp. 37-39. 
115  European Commission, ‘Small arms and light weapons, The response of the European Union’, 2001, p. 17. 
116  UNIDIR, 2005, p. 30, and Cotonou Agreement (ACP/CE/en) art. 11. 
117  European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention’, Brussels, 11 April 2001, 
COM(2001) 211 final, p. 17.  
118  Council of the European Union, ‘EU Strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of Small Arms and 
Light Weapons (SALW) and their ammunition’, Brussels, 13 January 2006, 5319/06, par. 14 and 15 (a). 
119  Ibid., par. 17. 
120  Ibid., par. 10.  
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4. The Exports Control in Practice: Is the Code of Conduct Effective? 
 
4.1 Preliminary information  
Several studies have already pointed out that the application of the Code has been different depend-
ing on the country, the situation and the criterion concerned121 – this is also confirmed by the dif-
ferences in the frequency with which each criterion has been invoked for the denial of a licence122.   
While no research to date has specifically addressed the effectiveness of criterion 2 in curbing 
European export of small arms to countries which violate human rights, some studies do provide 
important information. According to Bromley and Brzoska, there has been a significant policy 
change after the adoption of the Code with regards to export of conventional arms to countries with 
very low human rights scores. As they claim, “those states with very bad human rights records had, 
on average, significantly lower shares in arms exports from EU member countries after the adop-
tion of the EU Code”123. Whereas they found this trend in relation with gross human rights viola-
tions (physical integrity rights), the same trend was not evident when they looked at the respect of 
political and civil rights. But, their analysis did not take small arms into account. Hence, although 
we could expect a trend in small arms exports consistent with their findings, this is not necessarily 
endorsed by their analysis.  
Other studies focusing more specifically on the efficacy of the Code in controlling the export of 
small arms find rather divergent trends. None of them, though, looked exclusively at criterion 2. 
Holm, for instance, analyses the impact of the Code on the national legal frameworks of three 
European countries and found significant differences in exporting trends, established national 
frameworks, and the effects of Europeanisation of the Code124. Jackson, Marsh and Thurin, on the 
other hand, analyze the application of the Code with regard to armed conflict situations and find 
that, compared to the strong language of criterion 3, the observed effects are at best marginal. They 
further conclude that “the introduction of the Code has certainly not stopped the export of arms to 
countries in which there is protracted civil war”125. These projects, moreover, exclusively use Euro-
stat data as source of information about arms exports. As it has been pointed out in the methodo-
logical section, customs data do not merge with the scope of action of the Code and do not usually 
report information about military equipment. 
Starting from these significant but not exhaustive findings, and integrating customs data with all 
other sources available, this chapter analyses the exports from Belgium, Germany and Italy to the 
thirteen countries of concern. 
 
4.2 The customs data 
Putting the first piece of a jigsaw puzzle into place is always a tricky game. The difficulty is that 
one is forced to select one tiny piece from a myriad of possibilities that is nevertheless indicative of 
the greater picture. In the case of this study there is a similar hazard, most notably the prospect of 
looking at some data trends that are actually inconsistent with small arms exports on the whole. 
Taking a lesson from the jigsaw puzzle, a practical starting point would to be find “the four corners 
and the border” of the data at hand: the Eurostat data on the exports from Belgium, Germany and 
Italy to the countries of concern. Of course, it only provides a broad image in which the colours and 
the actors are still a blur; but it does frame the area of interest adequately enough to enable further 
analysis.  
Table 4.1 and graph 4.1 show the value of the aggregate exports from each exporter to all the re-
cipients in the period 1998-2006. 
                                                     
121  See Jackson, Marsh, Thurin, 2005, Bauer, 2004(b), p. 40, Holm, 2006, Bromley, Brzoska, 2007. 
122  Bauer, 2004(b), p. 41, reports that criterion 2 has been invoked less frequently than others. 
123  Bromley, Brzoska, 2007. 
124  Holm, 2006. p. 229. 
125  Jackson, Marsh, Thurin, 2005, p. 74. 
 21
Table 4.1:  Exports from Belgium, Germany and Italy to the countries of concern, 1998-2006  
(Values are in euro) 
 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Belgium nd 11.185 nd 5.675 26.014.140 6.101.575 28.462.336 3.802.063 4.662.749 
Germany 5.566.630 2.126.593 4.257.094 4.011.227 2.669.205 5.402.880 3.862.518 6.831.726 5.207.744 
Italy 946.515 1.939.735 8.486.430 22.130.604 4.093.214 2.624.075 2.836.914 6.296.869 2.146.416 
          
TOTAL 6.513.145 4.077.513 12.743.524 26.147.506 32.776.559 14.128.530 35.161.768 16.930.658 12.016.909 
 
Source: Eurostat COMEXT database (acceded 28 May 2007). 
Notes: (a) No data are available for Belgium in 1998 and 2000, and very poor data are available in 1999 and 
2001. Therefore the total for the period 1998-2001 is certainly underestimated. (b) The extremely high 
amount of export from Belgium in 2002 largely consist of “confidential trade” exports to United Arab Emir-
ates, and in 2004 to Saudi Arabia. From a double-check in the UN Comtrade database it results that it con-
sisted in export of the category 930690. (c) A large amount of the export from Italy in 2001 were classified 
under category 930690 and directed to United Arab Emirates.  
 
 
Graph 4.1:  Exports from Belgium, Germany and Italy to the countries of concern, 1998-2006  
(Values are in million euros) 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
year
m
illi
on
 e
ur
os
Italy
Germany
Belgium
Source: Eurostat COMEXT database (acceded 28 May 2007). 
 
The incompleteness of the data and the recurrent change in the tendency of the exports do not allow 
the identification of a clear trend. We observe a decrease in the last three years, but a similar trend 
already appeared between 2002 and 2003 and changed dramatically in 2004. Moreover, the de-
crease is determined exclusively by a serious reduction of Belgian exports, while in the same year 
both Italian and German exports increased. Finally, the outstanding amount of exports from Bel-
gium in the years 2002 and 2004, as well as from Italy in 2001, confuse the picture more than they 
clarify it. The lack of data on Belgium for the first years makes it difficult to estimate if at least the 
total amount of export in the most recent years has been lower than in the first years of the period.  
In order to integrate these disparate figures and add some pieces to the centre of the puzzle, we can 
look at the same phenomenon from the point of view of the recipient countries. That is, we can 
compare the export data of Belgium, Germany and Italy with the import data of the countries of 
concern. The UN Comtrade database allows us to do just that. In principle at least, the two figures 
should merge. Unfortunately, as table 4.2 and graph 4.2 show, the results are extremely different. 
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Table 4.2:  Imports in the countries of concern from Belgium, Germany and Italy, 1998-2006  
(Values are in USD) 
 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Belgium 1.264.763 4.171.890 61.508.950 145.610.256 104.553.659 85.140.751 28.355.376 163.205.908 368.106 
Germany 163.598 3.124.541 10.541.807 2.438.937 1.670.674 4.698.719 9.767.085 11.368.969 69.764 
Italy 160.100 55.113 394.493 559.127 771.431 1.034.922 997.842 3.612.480 926.904 
           
TOTAL 1.588.461 7.351.544 72.445.250 148.608.320 106.995.764 90.874.392 39.120.303 178.187.357 1.364.774 
 
Source: UN Comtrade database (acceded 28 May 2007). 
Notes: (a) Not all the countries of concern report their import to the UN Comtrade. In particular Algeria, 
Egypt, Uzbekistan and Vietnam did not report any data in the period considered. (b) To date only Pakistan 
reported the data concerning 2006. Therefore the figure should not be considered significant.   
 
 
Graph 4.2:     Imports in the countries of concern from Belgium, Germany and Italy, 1998-2006 
        (Values are in million USD) 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
year
m
ill
io
n 
U
S
D Italy
Germany
Belgium
Source: UN Comtrade database (acceded 28 May 2007). 
 
The markedly higher amount of flows reported by Comtrade is largely determined by the excep-
tional quantity of imports from Belgium. The disaggregated data shed some light on the picture. 
First, the largest part of the imports from Belgium consists of exports to Saudi Arabia. This single 
export market is so comparatively large that if we consider the picture excluding Saudi Arabia, the 
total figure even falls below the export figures reported by Eurostat. Furthermore, whereas we said 
that Belgium, Germany and Italy do not report to Eurostat their military exports (9301, in the cate-
gory used both by Eurostat and Comtrade), part of those flows are reported as imports by the re-
cipient countries. This can explain, somewhat, why the data of table 4.2 are so much higher than 
those of table 4.1. Indeed, a portion of the exports to Saudi Arabia from Belgium are reported under 
the 9301 class: in 2005, for instance, they were almost 18 million dollars. This does not explain 
everything however: in the same year Saudi Arabia declared another 145 million dollars of imports 
from Belgium under other headings, while Belgium reported exports for only 3.5 million dollars. 
Not only are the values of the trade flows very different according to the two sources, but the trend 
described by UN Comtrade diverges from the one illustrated by Eurostat as well. (graph 4.3) 
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Graph 4.3:     Export and import from Belgium, Germany and Italy, 1998-2006  
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Source: UN Comtrade, Eurostat COMEXT (acceded 28 May 2007). 
Notes: (a) The data about total export are in €, the data about total import are in USD; (b) the data about 2006 
have been omitted due to their incompleteness.  
 
While the two trends run roughly parallel until 2003, since that year they begin to run along oppo-
site tracks. In 2004, the two figures approach each other quite closely, but this is true only with 
regard to the total amount. The data reported by each country differ significantly.  
Due to the frequent overlap of the data, it is obviously not possible to sum the two figures. 
However, we can partially integrate the two statistics by taking the information from one when it is 
absent in the other. In the case that both databases report information, the highest value is taken. In 
this rule of thumb, it is assumed that a country may have interest in hiding parts of its ex-
port/import, but it would not have any reason to declare more than it actually trades. Table 4.3 
shows the results of this exercise while graph 4.4 illustrates it.  
 
Table 4.3:  Aggregate value of exports from Belgium, Germany and Italy to the countries of concern, 1998-
2006 (Values are in €) 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Belgium 1.076.060 4.153.116 65.519.333 165.054.900 121.680.004 70.859.562 28.462.336 137.990.827 4.941.663 
Germany 5.566.630 4.728.548 13.900.428 4.641.095 3.441.468 7.795.120 8.227.632 15.030.619 5.207.744 
Italy 1.060.182 1.941.198 8.567.333 22.219.392 4.132.375 2.719.184 3.034.398 6.448.018 2.370.187 
           
TOTAL 7.702.872 10.822.862 87.987.094 191.915.387 129.253.847 81.373.866 39.724.366 159.469.464 12.519.594 
 
Source: UN Comtrade, Eurostat COMEXT (acceded 28 May 2007). 
Notes: (a) The figures taken from UN Comtrade have been transformed into € by using the official exchange 
rate of the last working day of the year concerned (available online via www.x-rates.com/cgi-
bin/hlookup.cgi, accessed 03 June 2007). (b) the data concerning 2006 cannot be considered very relevant 
due to the lack of information in the UN Comtrade database (see note (b) table 3.2). 
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Graph 4.4:     Aggregate export to the thirteen countries of concern, 1998-2006 
         (values are in million euros) 
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Source: UN Comtrade, Eurostat COMEXT (acceded 28 May 2007). 
Notes: (a) the data concerning 2006 are very partial and therefore can not be considered significant. 
 
This aggregate result seems therefore to be the most complete picture we can obtain from the cus-
toms data. The trend, evidently, is similar to the one described by Comtrade (graph 4.2) and again 
it is largely explained by exports from Belgium to Saudi Arabia. In fact, if we exclude Saudi Ara-
bia from the analysis, the picture is rather different and Italy emerges as the largest exporter with 
over 50 million euros in the whole period126. And yet the trend remains irregular, with peaks in 
2001 and 2002 largely determined by exports to United Arab Emirates. While the total value of 
exports is much lower, this does not necessarily imply an effect of the Code, especially considering 
that the value in 2005 is more than three times that of 1998. Only the decrease of Belgian exports 
since 2003 may be indicative of a partial effect of the incorporation of the Code into national law 
(supra, § 3.2.2), but the astonishing amount of exports to Saudi Arabia refutes this argument across 
the board. Conversely, it may be suggestive of other factors – perhaps the strategic importance of 
energy supplies – that are influencing the export policies of the member states more than the con-
sideration of human rights in the country of destination. 
Bearing this in mind, it is possible to confront the aggregate figure obtained in table 4.3 with the 
human rights scores of each recipient country in order to see whether a correlation exists between 
the level and the trend of violations of human rights and the level and the trend of small arms ex-
ports. The regression analysis to follow treats physical integrity rights (PIR) and civil and political 
rights (CIVPOL) as independent variables, and takes the aggregate export (in euro) of Belgium, 
Germany and Italy as the dependent variable127.  
The results show that only 15% of the variance in the exports can be explained by PIR and 
CIVPOL (rsquare=0.154), but surprisingly this influence is determined exclusively by the scores of 
civil and political rights and it operates counter-intuitively, i.e. the higher the violations of these 
rights in a given country, the more arms are exported to it (PIR: Beta=0.00, p=.99), (CIVPOL: 
Beta=-0.39, p<.001)128.  
                                                     
126  Belgium accounted for nearly 30 million euros and Germany for 33 million. 
127  To create the independent variables a mean score for PIR was based on an aggregation of PTS and CIRI scores. 
Similarly the CIVPOL score was based on a mean of FH and Polity IV scores. The scores of different years have 
been considered separately. 
128  The Beta coefficient, or standardized coefficient, is done to answer the question which of the independent variables 
have a greater effect on the dependent variable, that is, which variable, between PIR and CIVPOL influences more 
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It should be recognized once more, however, that a large part of the exports were directed to one 
single country (Saudi Arabia) with very low CIVPOL scores and not so low PIR scores129. In fact, 
performing the regression analysis absent Saudi Arabia, the picture differs significantly. It confirms 
that Saudi Arabia has received a “special treatment” from the three exporter countries. CIVPOL no 
longer have a significant influence on exports (beta=0.07, p=.48), whereas PIR have predictive 
power over the exports (beta=0.25, p=.02), suggesting in general terms that small arms exports 
from Belgium, Germany and Italy decrease when the violations of physical integrity rights are 
more severe. However, the predictive power of the model has decreased considerably. It now only 
explains 6% of the variance in exports (rsquare=0.060), a value that should be considered nearly 
insignificant.  
This correlation between PIR and arms exports seems in line with the findings of Bromley and 
Brzoska130. Nonetheless, we should notice that their model explained a rather larger portion of the 
exports (rsquare=0.21), which may indicate that the human rights situation of the recipient country 
is more significant for exports of conventional weapons other than small arms (Bromley and 
Brzoska’s model)131. 
More generally, this analysis shows that many other factors (which account for the remaining 94% 
of the model) are coming into play to determine the exports of small arms. This suggests that crite-
rion 2 of the Code has had a marginal effect on the three exporter countries considered and that 
only violations of physical integrity rights have been partially taken into account by policy makers. 
Importantly, it confirms that the strategic importance of a country strongly influences the decision 
behind the export of small arms. The astonishing level of export to Saudi Arabia, indeed, shows 
that even very low scores for civil and political rights are not deemed to constitute a reason to curb 
the exports to the country. 
 
4.3 Provisional conclusions 
The analysis of customs data showed that Belgium has been by far the largest exporter of small 
arms to the countries of concern during the period 1998-2006 and that Saudi Arabia, by being the 
main recipient of Belgian exports, has also been the largest recipient from the three European coun-
tries considered. Conversely, depending on the year and the data source, Italy is shown to be a lar-
ger exporter than Germany or vice versa.  
Particular to the case of Belgium, the dramatic decrease witnessed since 2002 seems consistent 
with the growing attention that the issue of arms exports received from public opinion in that pe-
riod and the subsequent transposition of the Code into national law in 2003. While the data without 
Saudi Arabia are suggestive of this interpretation, the fact that in 2005 Saudi Arabia again received 
over 130 million Euros of small arms shows how minimal the effect has been, and how strategic 
factors prevailed over human rights concerns. The inversion of the trend in 2005 may also be a 
delayed consequence of the aforementioned shift of competencies in export control from the fed-
eral to the regional level.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                
the exports. The higher is the Beta the more influence the independent variable has on the dependent variable. The 
sign, instead, indicates the sense (positive or negative) of the influence. The coefficient p, instead, is the result of 
the t test and it indicates the reliability of each coefficient in describing the model. It ranges from -1 to +1 and the 
closer is to zero the most reliable is the result. 
129  According to the percentage scale I elaborated for the selection of the recipient countries (supra, chapter 2) the 
mean score for CIVPOL in the period 1998-2005 had been 1%, while for PIR had been 53%. 
130  Bromley, Brzoska, 2007. In their analysis the score for physical integrity rights is given by the PTS score. 
131  Yet other factors are likely to have an influence on this divergence, primarily the difference in the countries and the 
timescale analysed. 
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Graph 4.5:     The trend of exports disaggregated by exporter country, 1998-2006 
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The decrease marked by the German export after 2000 could similarly be a consequence of the 
inclusion of the criteria of the Code in the “political principles” for the export of weapons. None-
theless, the increasing trend that both Germany and Italy exhibit since 2002 could indicate the ab-
sence of a long lasting effect of the Code in shaping the export policies of the two countries, or 
possibly the inverse effect of the Europeanisation as argued by Holm132. The disaggregated data, 
moreover, confirm that the exports to some recipients, e.g. Pakistan, have increased considerably of 
late.  
More generally, it does not seem possible to distinguish a clear effect of the entrance into force of 
the Code beyond the “indirect” and “partial” as in the cases of Belgium and Germany. The regres-
sion analysis above confirms that human rights concerns explain the decision making of the mem-
ber states only minimally; that even where influential, human rights are less significant for small 
arms than for other conventional arms; and it highlights the greater priority given to physical integ-
rity rights relative to civil and political rights in deeming a recipient country significantly problem-
atic. The analysis also reflects the disparate weight that the text of the Code affords these two cate-
gories of rights (supra, paragraph 3.2.3). We should therefore conclude that the exports depended 
mainly on other factors such as existent national frameworks, commercial and strategic interests 
rather than compliance with the Code.  
To go back to the metaphor used in the beginning of the chapter, we can say that we now have the 
basic outline of the picture along wit some miscellaneous pieces scattered in the centre. This is not 
enough, though, to bring the whole image into focus. With the help of other sources, notably the 
national and the EU annual report, the next section attempts to bring greater clarity to our jigsaw 
puzzle and to evaluate the validity of the provisional conclusions above. 
 
4.4 The export reports: some new pieces of the puzzle 
The national and the EU Annual report, with the partial exception of Germany, are poor in data on 
small arms. But, they can provide useful information to appraise the conclusions arrived in the 
previous section. The German case, in particular, constitutes a unique chance to compare the dif-
ferent sources and to understand extent to which they differ.  
                                                     
132  Holm, 2006, p. 231. 
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4.4.1 Comparing the export reports with the customs data: the case of Germany 
Germany is one of the world’s major producers of conventional weapons, being the second largest 
exporter of small arms in the EU. While more than 30 companies are active in manufacturing small 
arms, the most important are Heckler & Koch, Rheinmetall DeTec, JP Sauer & Sohn, and Carl 
Walther133. German small arms are also manufactured under licence in a wide range of countries, 
among which there are countries with very low human rights records such as Pakistan, Saudi Ara-
bia, Iran and Myanmar134.  
Since 2002, the German export report has included a paragraph about the export of small arms, 
demonstrating, at least on paper, a better understanding of the importance of this sector in the con-
trol of arms exports. According to the national export report in 2002, small arms and ammunitions 
accounted for only the 2,3% of all arms exports135. Nonetheless, this figure is clearly underesti-
mated because it refers only to a part of all small arms exports reported by the German government. 
In fact, the same report uses small arms in two meanings, both to indicate a class of its Export List 
(A 0001 – “Small Firearms”) including also civil equipment and sporting and hunting rifles (438,9 
million €), and to indicate a more restrictive category (“Small Arms”) in line with the EU 1998 
Joint Action (61,6 million €)136. If we consider the first meaning, then, the share of small arms (in-
cluding ammunition, EL-A 0003) to total exports becomes 17.6%.  
However, besides the confusion that may arise from these two different categories, the information 
contained in the Report is certainly the most significant to assess the effectiveness of the Code with 
regards to the respect of human rights. In fact, as opposed to the customs data, the category of 
“Small Arms” refers exclusively to the equipment included in the Common Military List and cov-
ered by the Code; we should therefore assume that any effect of the implementation of the Code, if 
existing, would be manifest in this case. The figures concerning the export to the countries of con-
cern are reported in table 4.4. 
 
Table 4.4:  Individual licences for the export of Small Arms and Ammunitions to the countries of concern, 
2002-2005 (Values in €) 
 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 
Egypt 20.721 2.952.030 1.034.160 1.350 
Kazakhstan 2.796 0 331.000 4.752 
Oman 0 0 32.700 4.595 
Saudi Arabia 2.134.470 1.445.259 3.578.086 5.811.297 
UAE 607.230 552.468 737.405 291.213 
     
TOTAL 2.765.217 4.949.757 5.713.351 6.113.207 
Source: German national export report, years 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006. 
Notes: (a) Germany did not report any export to Algeria, Belarus, Cameroon, Iran, Pakistan, Tunisia, Uzbeki-
stan, Vietnam in the period 2002-2005; (b) the data for Egypt shift back and forth between millions of Euros 
(years 2003 and 2004) and only few thousands of Euros (years 2002 and 2005). Unfortunately a full under-
standing of the reasons behind these shifts requires an analysis of the commercial bilateral relations and in 
particular of the trends from the demand side which are not provided by this study.  
 
Although the Report stresses that “Germany does not allow any deliveries of small arms to coun-
tries where such deliveries might be conducive (…) to human rights infringements”137, the total 
value of the licences to the countries of concern increased constantly since 2002 to 2005. This is 
determined in large part by a definite increase of licences to Saudi Arabia. Whereas the licences to 
Egypt suffered a clear reduction, the UAE has been a steadily important recipient for the whole 
period. Furthermore, in 2004 two other countries began (or resumed) to import. These data confirm 
                                                     
133  Small Arms Survey, 2002, p. 34. 
134  Abel, 2000, p. 90 and Small Arms Survey, 2002, pp. 49-53. 
135  ‘Report of the Federal Republic of Germany on its Policy on Exports of Conventional Military Equipment covering 
the year 2002’, Berlin, 17 December 2003, pp. 25-33. 
136  See also Bauer, 2004(b), note 17, p. 47 
137  ‘Report of the Federal Republic of Germany on its Policy on Exports of Conventional Military Equipment covering 
the year 2000’, Berlin, 23 November 2001, pp. 19-20. 
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the trend reported by Holm that the German exports of small arms to countries138 in breach of crite-
ria 2, 3, and 4 of the Code actually increased after its implementation139. 
Additionally, the EU Annual Report has included since 2003 data disaggregated both by categories 
of the Common Military List as well as by recipient country. 140 Germany is once again the only 
country among those considered to report this information to its European partners. Lacking an 
apposite category referring to small arms and for the purpose of the analysis at hand, the data are 
considered with respect to categories ML1-ML3. The information available for the years 2003-
2005 is shown in table 4.5. 
 
Table 3.5:  Licences issued by Germany for the export of items of categories ML1-ML3 to the countries of 
concern, 2003-2005 (Values in €) 
 2003 2004 2005 
Belarus 231.437 140.047 128.086 
Egypt 4.446.406 10.801.018 1.350 
Kazakhstan 493.655 729.487 913.057 
Oman 80.318 350.108 352.553 
Pakistan 9.822 5.200 7.160.842 
Saudi Arabia 3.909.160 9.891.076 6.210.446 
UAE 9.574.137 8.618.675 8.304.964 
Vietnam 10.760 0 0 
TOTAL 18.755.695 30.535.611 23.071.298 
Source: Sixth, Seventh, Eighth Annual Report According to Operative Provision 8 of the Code of Conduct, 
years 2004, 2005, 2006.  
Notes: The document did not report any export to Algeria, Cameroon, Iran, Tunisia, Uzbekistan in the period. 
 
The figures are markedly higher than those recorded by the German report due to the fact that the 
categories ML1-ML3 encompass a broader list of small arms than the one considered by Germany. 
Although categories ML1-ML3 do not merge precisely with the definition adopted by this study, 
one should consider these figures to be nevertheless strongly indicative of the target measurement 
and the author’s concern for the regrettably small portion of this data reported as small arms ex-
ports by the German authorities. Three years are not enough to detect a clear tendency, but if one 
can assume that the exports to countries of concern have not dropped dramatically, one can safely 
conclude that the Code has not had a significant effect on small arms exports.  
At this point we can follow the suggestion of Jackson, Marsh and Thurin and compare the data 
of the national and the European reports with those of the customs data141.  
 
 
 
                                                     
138  The 20 recipient countries considered by Holm are partially the same of this study. For a complete list see Holm, 
2006, note 9, p. 231. 
139  Holm, 2006, pp. 229-230. 
140  Council of the European Union, ‘6th  Annual Report in conformity with Operative Provision 8 of the European 
Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports’, 11 November 2004, 13816/04.  
141  Jackson, Marsh, Thurin, 2005, p. 53. 
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Graph 4.6: German exports of small arms and ammunitions to the countries of concern, 2002-2005 
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Source: German national export report, years 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, Eurostat COMEXT database. 
 
Graph 4.6 starts by comparing the data reported by the German export report and by Eurostat. The 
two figures do not appear altogether disparate. Although the slope of the Eurostat graph is less 
consistent, both indicate a general increase. However, the apparent resemblance can be misleading. 
First, the data taken from the German export report only refer to 5 countries, while the Eurostat 
reports exports to all the thirteen countries of concern. Second, if the data is considered disaggre-
gated by country, the differences are significant. According to Eurostat, for instance, in 2002 Ger-
many exported €631,448 of small arms to Saudi Arabia, while in its own export report the flow 
amounted to €2.13 million. In fact, the discrepancies run both ways: while according to Eurostat 
€271,277  were exported from Germany to Kazakhstan in 2002, the national export report only 
mentioned components for submachine guns for €2,796.  
Such a divergence is largely explained by the fact that Eurostat does not report military exports. On 
the contrary, the German export report does exclude all civil firearms. The “total” shown in the 
graph thus assumes that the two data can be summed up. Although this is not very consistent statis-
tically and underestimates the fact that in the German report we are looking at the licences issued 
while Eurostat refers to actual exports, it can at least be considered an indicator of the average 
trend.  
Recalling that Comtrade reports part of the military exports as “imports” in the recipient countries, 
we can compare the total of graph 4.6 with the aggregate value of Eurostat and Comtrade obtained 
in table 4.3. Unsurprised by the discrepancy in their values, we can also point out that in this case 
the trends are similar and indicate an increase (graph 4.7).  
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Graph 4.7:     Comparison between the total of graph 4.6 and the aggregate from Eurostat and Comtrade 
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Source: German national export report, years 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, Eurostat COMEXT database, UN 
Comtrade. 
 
 
 
 
Graph 4.8:     Comparison between export reports and customs data 
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Source: German national export report, years 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, Eurostat COMEXT database, UN 
Comtrade, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth Annual Report According to Operative Provision 8 of the Code of Con-
duct, years 2004, 2005, 2006. 
Notes: (a) Eurostat and Eurostat-Comtrade refer to actual exports; the national and the EU Annual Report 
refer to licences issued.  
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Finally, Graph 4.8 introduces the trend drawn by the EU annual reports. While the national report 
and all customs data have given the univocal indication of an increase in exports during the last 
years, albeit with different intensities, the EU annual reports sketch a different picture. This is even 
more significant considering that the annual reports are documents released according to the Code 
of Conduct and should be of primary importance for this study. They report a noticeably higher 
value of exports that it is difficult to explain with the data available. The general trend is less clear 
and somewhat contradictory to the other data, but the increase from 2003 to 2005 is nonetheless 
confirmed. 
By comparing the German and European export data with the customs data, the pieces in the centre 
of the puzzle are now linked to the outline. As such, the integrated information thus far provides a 
better understanding of the trend of German export of small arms. Overall, an increase of export to 
the countries of concern can be detected, showing that the Code has not been effective in curbing 
the export to countries with very bad records on human rights.  
In truth, this conclusion is indirectly confirmed by the fact that in recent years the licences for ex-
ports to third countries (non-EU and non-NATO) have dramatically increased both in the absolute 
value and in the relative share, passing from the 2.1% of the small arms exports reported by the 
German government in 2000142 to the 24% in 2005143. This relative growth in share of German 
exports assumes even more significance considering that the export licences to the countries con-
cerned in this study constitute a large (perhaps increasing) part – over 30% - of the total amount of 
licences144. 
 
4.4.2 The geographical distribution of the small arms exports of Italy 
Unfortunately, an assessment as detailed as in the case of Germany is not possible with regard to 
Italy and Belgium due to the lack of information about small arms contained in their national re-
ports. Italy reports information on the exports of every single company, but this in fact confuses the 
picture more than it aids our understanding it. The data provided are not broken down by category 
and recipient country at the same time, and they do not even allow any delineation of the propor-
tion of small arms to the total military exports. Notwithstanding this incompleteness, the geo-
graphical distribution of their small arms exports can indirectly provide an indication of the trend 
of exports likely to end up in the countries of concern.  
Italy is a major exporter of conventional weapons and the largest European exporter of small arms. 
Of the over 40 companies involved in the production of small arms, the most familiar is certainly 
Beretta S.p.a., which in 2000 had sales for over $290 million US. Also, Italian companies allow 
their products to be manufactured under licence in foreign countries including Indonesia and Egypt. 
According to the Small Arms Survey in 2001, the main recipient of the at least $298 million of 
Italian exports of small arms were the United States, Belgium, France, Germany and the UK145. 
This relative distribution can also be confirmed in a recent study by Lagrasta, who found that in the 
period 1999-2003 80% of Italian exports of weapons ended in western countries146. These data, 
however, only refer to civil equipment and do not provide a basis for conclusions about the effec-
tiveness of the Code.  
The information about military exports contained in the national export report does not completely 
confirm these findings, although it should be noted that the latter refers to the exports of all catego-
ries of arms and not small arms specifically. Asia, North Africa and the Middle East have ac-
counted for almost one third of the Italian military export during most of the years considered. This 
is interesting because they represent the areas where most of the countries of concern are situated. 
                                                     
142  Report of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on its Policy on Exports of Conventional Military 
Equipment in 2000, 2001, p. 19. The total takes into account the export of both small arms and their ammunitions. 
143  Report of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on its Policy on Exports of Conventional Military 
Equipment in 2005, 2006, pp. 37-42. 
144  ‘Report of the Federal Republic of Germany on its Policy on Exports of Conventional Military Equipment covering 
the years 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005. 
145  Small Arms Survey, 2001, p. 104. It is worthy to be reminded that in this amount, taken by UN Contrade, are not 
reported military weapons.  
146  Lagrasta, 2005. 
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Saudi Arabia, in particular, was in 2001 the second largest recipient of Italian exports for an 
amount of over 119 million euros, confirming the argument above that strategic importance often 
trumps human rights and other concerns147. 
The share of exports directed to North Africa and the Middle East decreased from almost 18.6% in 
2001 to less than 4% in 2004, but it inverted dramatically in 2005 (15.3%)148. It is difficult, though, 
to estimate if the decrease had been partly due to the implementation of the Code – specifically 
criterion 2. Assuming so would be consistent with the findings of Bromley and Brzoska149, but the 
fact that their analysis, like the data discussed here, refers to all military exports is inescapable. 
Consequently, there is no way to corroborate the validity of this assumption with regard to small 
arms. Examining the absolute values of exports and narrowing the analysis to the countries of con-
cern that are in these three areas, the increase at the end of the period is more intense (and alarm-
ing), but the frequent change in the tendency seems to suggest the absence of a durable pattern. 
Graph 4.9 shows this figure and compares it with the trend of exports of small arms as they 
emerged by the aggregate Eurostat-Comtrade since they are referring to the same group of coun-
tries.  
Although the differences in the source material (and most important, the items concerned) necessi-
tate caution, it warrants notice that the trend in small arms exports as reported by customs data has 
been definitely more consistent and decreasing (except in the last year). Looking at the variability 
of the figures provided by the national report and considering that the exports reported by Eurostat-
Comtrade are actually not covered by the Code, we can assume that the trend of exports of small 
arms reported in the customs data has not been shaped by the effect of the Code. Otherwise, it 
would be evident in the national data too.  
 
Graph 4.9:     Trend of exports of small arms in comparison with all military export, 2001-2005  
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Source: Italian national export report, years 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, UN Comtrade, Eurostat 
COMEXT. 
 
                                                     
147  Camera dei Deputati, ‘Relazione sulle operazioni autorizzate e svolte per il controllo dell’esportazione, importa-
zione e transito dei materiali di armamento nonché dell’esportazione e del transito dei prodotti ad alta tecnologia 
(anno 2001)’, 28 marzo 2002, p. 35. 
148  Camera dei Deputati, ‘Relazione sulle operazioni autorizzate e svolte per il controllo dell’esportazione, importa-
zione e transito dei materiali di armamento nonché dell’esportazione e del transito dei prodotti ad alta tecnologia’, 
years 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006. 
149  Bromley, Brzoska, 2007. 
 33
4.4.3 The danger of the regionalisation in Belgian export controls 
Despite a rather small defence industry, Belgium is a major exporter of small arms that accounted 
for more than one third of the total value of its military exports in 2002150. There are at least 15 
companies involved in the industry of small arms, but the production is dominated by FN Herstal, 
which since 1997 is entirely owned by the Walloon regional government151. FN Herstal’s products 
are exported to more than 90 countries and they have been manufactured under licence in more 
than 20 countries, including Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa152. 
According to Comtrade in 2001, the largest recipient of the €234 million of Belgian small arms 
exports was Saudi Arabia, preceding the United States, France, Portugal and the UK153. On the 
other hand, according to the Belgian export report, the licences for exports in small arms in 2001 
were definitely lower – accounting for only €82 million154. Although the export report does not 
isolate the information about the geographical distribution of small arms exports, the data about the 
total military exports reported in the Belgian official document seem to confirm the centrality of 
Middle East in Belgian exports. In 2001, Saudi Arabia was reported to be the largest recipient of 
military equipment for an amount of €101 million. Whereas it is not possible to define the exact 
amount of small arms, 12 of the 18 licences granted for that year did concern small arms155. The 
Middle East, in general, has always been the primary (or secondary) area of destination of Belgian 
exports, although the total value decreased significantly in 2002156.  
The Belgian export report also does not provide data on small arms exports broken down into re-
cipient countries. However, the total export of small arms has been rather constant during the same 
period. In 1998, it amounted for over 112 million Euro, and despite a slight inflection in the follow-
ing years it rose again up to almost 104 million in 2002157.  
Evidently, it is not possible to link this figure with the data about the geographical distribution dis-
cussed above or to deduce a trend in small arms exports to the areas of main concern, notably the 
Middle East. It is, however, possible to assume that, if existing, a clear reduction of exports in 
small arms to Middle East should appear in both statistics. It thus seems reasonable to conclude 
that exports have not reduced significantly. The reduction of exports to Middle East in 2002 men-
tioned above can however be seen as a partial explanation of the observed decrease in Belgian ex-
ports of small arms to countries of concern for the same year obtained in paragraph 4.2 (see graph 
4.4). 
Unfortunately, due to the reform of the Belgian law in 2003 which transferred control of military 
exports to the regional level, it is not possible to have an aggregate figure after 2002. The data are 
reported in three different documents and are neither complete nor homogeneous.  
The 2005 Wallonian report shows that the Middle East is still an important recipient area of Bel-
gian exports, accounting for over €100 million from Wallonia alone158. But, it does not provide any 
                                                     
150  Rapport du Gouvernement Belge au Parlement sur l'application de la loi du 5 août 1991 sur les importations, les 
exportations et les transferts d'armes, de munitions et de matériel pouvant servir à un usage militaire ainsi que les 
technologies y afférentes’, du 1er Janvier 2002 au 31 Decembre 2002, (GRIP Data, available on www.grip.org, 
consulted on 10 July 2007). 
151  Small Arms Survey, 2002, p. 31. 
152  Ibid., 2002, p. 43. 
153  Small Arms Survey, 2004, p. 103. 
154  ‘Rapport du Gouvernement Belge au Parlement sur l'application de la loi du 5 août 1991 sur les importations, les 
exportations et les transferts d'armes, de munitions et de matériel pouvant servir à un usage militaire ainsi que les 
technologies y afférentes’, du 1er Janvier 2001 au 31 Decembre 2001, (GRIP Data, available on www.grip.org, 
consulted on 10 July 2007), pp. 15-16. 
155  Ibid., p. 9. 
156  ‘Rapport du Gouvernement Belge au Parlement sur l'application de la loi du 5 août 1991 sur les importations, les 
exportations et les transferts d'armes, de munitions et de matériel pouvant servir à un usage militaire ainsi que les 
technologies y afférentes’, years 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003. 
157  ‘Rapport du Gouvernement Belge au Parlement sur l'application de la loi du 5 août 1991 sur les importations, les 
exportations et les transferts d'armes, de munitions et de matériel pouvant servir à un usage militaire ainsi que les 
technologies y afférentes’, du 1er Janvier 2002 au 31 Decembre 2002, (GRIP Data, available on www.grip.org, 
consulted on 10 July 2007). 
158  Rapport au Parlement Wallon sur l’application de la loi du 5 août 1991, modifiée par les lois du 25 et 26 mars 2003, 
relative à l’importation, à l’exportation, au transit et à la lutte contre le trafic d'armes, de munitions et de matériel 
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information about the amount of small arms exported. These facts allow the supposition that the 
decrease of 2002 is not a durable trend, an assumption which is also in line with the customs data 
showed in graph 3.5. 
The government of the Brussels region in the period 2004-2005 issued only one licence for export 
of small arms to Pakistan in 2004159. 
The most complete document is issued by the Flemish government, and since 2005 it has organized 
the data by both categories and recipients. By analysing the information for the period 2004-2006, 
no issued licences for exports of small arms to the countries of concern are to be found160. More 
generally, the issuance of licences for any other military equipment by Flanders to the countries of 
concern have been sporadic in the last three years, accounting for €580,000  to Algeria, € 240,000  
to Oman and €340,000 to Pakistan in 2004, 2.4 million to Algeria, €20,000  to Iran, €60,000 to 
Pakistan in 2005, and over €500,000 to Pakistan in 2006161. However, looking at the actual deliver-
ies, in 2004 reported exports for more than €1 million to UAE and more than €2 million  to Saudi 
Arabia162.  
Finally, by comparing the total exports of the three regions, Wallonia appears to be the largest ex-
porter during the whole period. This suggests that the Belgian case is characterised by strong dif-
ferences in export controls at the regional level. Although the lack of information about the Wal-
lonian exports of small arms does not allow the adoption of a definitive position, it seems reason-
able to suppose that most of the Belgian exports of small arms to the countries of concern are origi-
nating in Wallonia. In this sense, there is serious potential for a conflict of interest in the localized 
export control regime:  recall that the largest Belgian company producing small arms, FN Herstal, 
is directly owned by the Wallonian government.  
 
4.5 Conclusions: an incomplete picture 
Detailed analysis conducted on a vast range of sources allows us to construct a picture from all the 
pieces available. Unfortunately, though, we suffer from the same frustration of approaching the 
finish of a jigsaw puzzle only to realize that a number of pieces are missing from the box. Unable 
to solicit for the missing pieces, we are left with no choice but to draw our conclusions from an 
incomplete picture.  
The conclusions based on the customs data were those of a non-effect of criterion 2 of the Code. 
The trends experienced by the three countries were found to be mainly dependant on other factors, 
e.g. existent national frameworks, commercial and strategic interests. 
With the exception of Germany (and Flanders since 2005) the national and EU annual report are far 
from exhaustive in their data on the export of small arms. Despite this limitation, however, the 
comparison between the different sources (in the case of Germany) and the analysis of the geo-
graphical distribution of arms exports reinforce the argument that the criterion 2 of the Code did 
not play a clear role in shaping the exports of small arms to the countries of concern. Evidence in 
support is to be found in the German case, in which the exports to the countries of concern actually 
increased according to the national report, suggesting of an even inverse effect of the Europeanisa-
tion of arms controls. The high variability of the total Italian exports to the regions where the coun-
tries of concern are situated further corroborates the story. Finally, in the case of Belgium, the data 
                                                                                                                                                                
devant servir spécialement à un usage militaire et de la technologie y afférente. Rapport annuel 2005 (GRIP Data, 
available on www.grip.org, consulted on 10 July 2007), p. 39. 
159  Rapport du Gouvernement de la Région de Bruxelles Capitale au Parliement concernant l’application de la loi du 5 
aout 1991, Période du 1er Janvier 2004 au 31 décembre 2004, p. 20. The amount is not specified, although together 
with a licence in another category the total amount of export licensed to Pakistan accounted for 8 millions €.159 
For 2005 data are available only for the period 1st July-31st December. 
160  Jaarlijsk Verslag van de Vlamse Regering over de verstrekte en geweigerde vergunningen voor wapens, minitie en 
speciaal voor militair gebruik of voor ordehandaving dienstig materieel en daaraan verbonden technologie, years 
2004, 2005 and 2006. The only export, in fact, is a transfer in 2005 from Czech Republic to Egypt of items of the 
category ML1 for an amount of 438.294 €. 
161  Ibid. 
162  Verslag NBB, Daadwerkelijke uitvoer van Vlaanderen in 2004, available on http://www.sipri.org/contents/arm-
strad/atlinks_gov.html#BEL (consulted on 10 July 2007). 
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until 2002 are absent any significant decrease. Moreover, the most recent data showed that the dif-
ferences in the regional export policies might have increased after the regionalisation of export 
controls in 2003. In particular, the increase of exports to Saudi Arabia in 2005 (from Wallonia) 
confirms that the intended effect of incorporating of the Code into national law may have been 
diluted by the regionalisation of Belgian export controls as well as other factors.   
The high amount of exports reported by customs and excluded by national export reports shows 
that, while the Common Military List (and therefore the Code) does not cover civil equipment, the 
countries considered by this study are exporting a significant amount of weapons (under the cate-
gory of non-military weapons, that is) to areas where violations of human rights are widespread. 
This suggests that the existing framework is inadequate to properly address the problem of prolif-
eration of small arms and violations of human rights. A solution must therefore acknowledge that 
civilian equipment can be as dangerous as military equipment in the repression of fundamental 
rights.  
All the data analyzed indicated the Middle East (the Gulf Region in particular) as the main recipi-
ent area of the small arms exports of the three exporters considered163. The national data also con-
firmed the importance of strategic factors in influencing the exports, Saudi Arabia being the clear-
est example. Whereas it has already been noted that the problem of civilian equipment currently 
falls outside the scope of the Code, the fact that even items covered by the Code keep being ex-
ported in high amounts to this region indicates that criterion 2 of the Code has not been effective 
even on the merits of its original intent.  
A final remark goes to the need for more accuracy and attention to small arms in the production of 
national and European export reports. The discrepancies between the customs, the national, and the 
EU data on German exports of small arms, for instance, substantiates what has been already 
pointed out in the methodological section: information is incomplete, contradictory, and overlap-
ping. Furthermore, it confirms the need for an agreed definition of small arms which will enable 
future studies to look at the complete picture. The plea, in other words, is to enable scholars and 
policy makers to complete the puzzle with all its pieces.  
 
 
5.  A Closer Sight: The Ineffectiveness of the EU’s Small Arms Export Control From a Hu-
man Rights Perspective  
 
5.1  Our old Saudi friends: traditional foreign policy interests win over human rights  
The importance of commercial and strategic interests emerged in chapter 4 as one of the main rea-
sons behind the issuance of a licence for small arms export. Member states were shown to hold 
these considerations in higher regard than respect for human rights in the recipient country. Obvi-
ously this is not the ideal forum for exploring the conflict between the traditional foreign policy 
interests and the EU’s promotion of human rights in its external action at great length164, but it is 
nevertheless useful to highlight some aspects of the debate with regard to arms exports which may 
aid our understanding of why the export controls have been so ineffective. 
In fact, although the mainstreaming of human rights in all EU’s policies has involved the arms 
export controls, the Union has a limited influence on the member states in this field, which remains 
at the intergovernmental level. It is sufficient to note that the Code is not legally binding and that 
any decision, eventually, is taken autonomously by each member state. The effectiveness of crite-
rion 2 is therefore limited by its very nature. The “continuing vitality” 165 of Art. 296 of the TEU 
(supra, § 3.2.1) is the main obstacle for any progress in the coordination between the member states 
export policies and the EU’s human rights concerns. In practice, this may generate what can be 
called a sort of schizophrenia, whereby the EU is taking action in one direction (promotion of hu-
                                                     
163  See also Le Monde Diplomatique, ‘The legal trade in light weapons’, June 2006, available on http://monde-
diplo.com/maps/lightarms (consulted on 10 July 2007).  
164  See for instance Gropas, 1999.  
165  Davis, 2002, pp. 109-110. 
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man rights) while the member states are undermining its action by reiterating their traditional for-
eign policy orientations.  
It would, however, be too simplistic to sketch a picture in which the EU is always right and the 
member states are always wrong. In fact, even the decision by the EU to deem a country in viola-
tion of international standards for human rights is highly dependant on political, strategic and 
commercial interests. Human rights issues, for instance, are neither central in the agenda with the 
Gulf countries nor are they raised in the context of small arms exports to those countries. In this 
sense, taking a closer look at  the “special treatment” granted to Saudi Arabia provides the best 
example about the predominance of strategic reasons – both in the member states’ view and in the 
EU’s view – over human rights concerns. 
In 2000, Amnesty International summarized the international community’s response to human 
rights violations in Saudi Arabia by one word – silence. Its strategic position and vast oil reserves, 
it was argued, have led governments and businesses around the world to subordinate human rights 
to economic and strategic interests166. The EU has followed this same pattern in its relations with 
the Kingdom. Energy167 and trade168 were the main interests behind the adoption of the Cooperation 
Agreement between the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the EU in 1989169 and the long last-
ing negotiation – not yet ended at the time of this writing – of a Free Trade Agreement. 
It is true that the EU has expressed its concern over the human rights situation in Saudi Arabia in 
all the Annual Reports on Human Rights, in several Démarches and Declarations, and in Common 
Positions to the UN General Assembly and the UN Commission on Human Rights170. However, no 
concrete mechanisms have been set up and human rights are a very marginal issue in the bilateral 
relations, demonstrating a lack of will and instruments to open a serious confrontation on the mat-
ter. In the words of the former EU commissioner for external relations, Chris Patten: “We [the 
Commission], do not have any representation in Saudi Arabia, nor do we have any representation 
in the Gulf. Nor do we have any competence to take any particular steps or to make a stand on an 
individual level in these particular cases [discrimination against Saudi women]”171. The free trade 
agreement, for instance, will not mention human rights, while the Strategic Partnership for the 
Mediterranean and the Middle East with regard to the GCC members only affirm the “desire to 
move more rapidly on issues of concern”172.    
The human rights situation is very serious in Saudi Arabia.173 Although one must recognize some 
distinctions – such as for between physical integrity rights, for which the violations are not as se-
vere as in other countries of concern174 – civil and political rights in Saudi Arabia are utterly non-
                                                     
166  http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/intcam/saudi/issues/mspr.html. 
167  The importance of the Gulf countries in this context was stressed by the European Commission, Green Paper, ‘A 
European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy’, COM(2006) 105 final, Brussels, 8 March 
2006. 
168  Mandelson, 2007, available on http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2007/february/tradoc_133369.pdf (consulted 
on 10 July 2007). 
169  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:21989A0225(01):EN:HTML. The members of the 
GCC are: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. 
170  Council of the European Union, Annual Reports on Human Rights, years 2001, 2002, 2003 , 2004, 2005. Particular 
concern was directed to torture, public execution, arbitrary detention, rule of law, the restrictions of the freedom of 
expression, religion, assembly, association, and the systematic discrimination against women. 
171  The EU is the first trading market for the countries of the Gulf area, while 70% of EU’s total import from them 
consists of fuels and derivates http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/news/patten/epsitting03_04_01.pdf. 
172  European Council, Final Report on a EU Strategic Partnership for the Mediterranean and the Middle East, June 
2004, p. 9. Available via http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Partnership%20Mediterranean%20and% 
20Middle%20East.pdf. 
173  In the past Saudi Arabia’s human rights record has also been subject to some scrutiny by the UN Commission on 
Human Rights under a “1503” confidential procedure for consideration of complaints of a "consistent pattern of 
gross human rights violations". See http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/intcam/saudi/report.html (consulted on 19 June 
2007). 
174  However, corporal punishments, torture, arbitrary arrest, and public execution are frequent, and until recently 
unlawful killings by security forces and armed groups have been a serious problem. (US State Department, Country 
Report, 2006. AI, Annual Report, 2006). See also UN Committee against Torture, 28th session (Geneva, 29 April 
to 17 May 2002) http://www.ishr.ch/hrm/tmb/treaty/cat/reports/cat_24-35/CAT_28.htm (consulted on 8 July 2007). 
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existent175. In fact, the Islamic law (Sharia) under the doctrine of Wahabism is theorethically the 
only limit to the king’s powers and the Kingdom is one of the few countries that have not ratified 
the ICCPR (which is mentioned expressly by criterion 2 of the EU Code of Conduct). So far, the 
Kingdom has avoided any sort of cooperation with the international community in the field of hu-
man rights, rejecting any “interference” in its legal system and asserting that its actions are based 
on its adherence to Islamic law176.  
The danger of arms flows to this country has been already pointed out by Amnesty International 
years ago: “Saudi Arabia’s human rights record shows why stringent national and international 
controls are needed for the arms and security industry – controls that guarantee public accountabil-
ity and ensure that weapons never fall into the hands of those likely to use them for torture or other 
human rights abuses”177. Of particular concern are the violent and arbitrary actions of the Commit-
tee to Promote Virtue and Prevent Vice (Mutawwa’in), or religious police, which is a semiautono-
mous agency that enforces adherence to strictly conservative Islamic norms by monitoring public 
behaviour178. 
 
 
Graph 5.1:     Exports of small arms to Saudi Arabia 
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Nonetheless, as already said, small arms are left free to flow in Saudi Arabia without raising par-
ticular concern to the European policy makers. As a result, the Kingdom is the largest recipient 
among the countries of concern to this study, importing small arms in amounts over 600 million 
Euros from 1998 to 2005179.  
As the dramatic increase of exports in 2005 shows, the trend does not suggest any clear effect of 
the entrance into force of the Code. In graph 5.1 an observable discrepancy exists between the cus-
                                                     
175  This emerges from the very low scores (a mean of 1%) received from Freedom House and Polity IV (supra, para-
graph 2.3). In particular the state arbitrary interferes with privacy, family, home, and correspondence and restricts 
all civil liberties; the rule of law is minimal (US State Department, Country Report, 2006). 
176  A fact-finding mission of Human Rights Watch was eventually permitted in December 2006. See Human Rights 
Watch, “Saudi Arabia: Despite Restrictions, Visit Uncovers Abuses”, 17 February 2007, available on 
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/02/17/saudia15353.htm (consulted on 19 June 2007). 
177  http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/intcam/saudi/issues/mspr.html. 
178  US State Department, Country Report, 2004, 2005, 2006 
179  The country also manufactures the G3 and ammunition under licence from the German firm Heckler & Koch. See 
Small Arms Survey, 2002, p. 18. 
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toms data and the export reports, which at first sight indicates a prevalence of non-military equip-
ment (thus not reported in the export reports). This astonishing figure confirms that European coun-
tries do not perceive any contradiction between such high flows of arms to Saudi Arabia and the 
poor situation regarding human rights. The findings of the regression analysis, moreover, show that 
the prevalence of violations of civil and political rights over the violations of physical integrity 
rights has rendered the country more legitimate to receive arms in the collective eyes of the EU 
member states. The 2002 Italian arms export report, for instance, gives a detailed description of the 
exports to Saudi Arabia while stressing, few pages before, the full compliance with all the Criteria 
of the Code180. Even clearer was the answer of the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs in 2000 to a 
parliamentary consultation questioning the deliveries of arms to Saudi Arabia in the light of the 
severe human rights situation:  
 
“Pour qu’une licence soit refusée, il doit donc exister un lien clair entre l’exportation d’armes et la vio-
lation des droits de l'homme. Les armes exportées en Arabie saoudite sont destinées au département 
saoudien de la Défense nationale. Pour tout pays de cette région, il est vital de disposer en permanence 
d'une capacité de défense réelle”181. 
 
Acknowledging that it is very difficult to establish a direct link between a weapon – a Belgian 
weapon in this case – and a concrete violation of human rights, recall that “the combination of 
‘clear risk’ and ‘might’ in the text [of the Code] (…) requires a lower burden of evidence than a 
clear risk that equipment will be used for internal repression”182.  
 
5.2 The missing links between arms export controls, human rights and small arms initiatives 
A significant finding of the statistical analysis, and in particular of the regression analysis, was that 
the effectiveness of criterion 2 had been weaker with regards to small arms than to other conven-
tional arms. This cannot be explained just by referring to the prevalence of strategic interests over 
human rights concerns because the influence of foreign policy issues should be assumed to have an 
impact on all sort of military exports, regardless of their size or type. The reasons for this failure 
should thus be sought somewhere else. 
In fact, some of the elements shaping the EU’s approach to the small arms export controls implic-
itly provide an explanation of this weakness.  
A first essential limit lies in the 1998 definition of small arms. The consideration of exclusively 
military equipment set a large part of the exports reported by customs data outside the scope of the 
Code183. Moreover, the definitions used by the three exporters partly differ from the one adopted by 
the EU, and the Italian one includes an even shorter list of items. Even more problematic, from the 
point of view of the effectiveness of the Code, is that the categories ML1-ML3 of the CML do not 
merge with the definition adopted by the Joint Action. The result of this “normative confusion” is 
that the Code lacks the basic tools of enforcing controls over small arms. Regrettably, the 2005 
small arms Strategy has highlighted neither the need for enlarging the definition nor the need for 
strengthening consistency within the CML. 
This inconsistency is also indicative of the serious lack of data availability with regards to small 
arms, the second important element of weakness for an effective small arms export control policy. 
While the Code has increased transparency and data availability about arms exports over the last 
                                                     
180  Camera dei Deputati, ‘Relazione sulle operazioni autorizzate e svolte per il controllo dell’esportazione, importa-
zione e transito dei materiali di armamento nonché dell’esportazione e del transito dei prodotti ad alta tecnologia 
(anno 2001)’, 28 marzo 2002, pp. 43-45. 
181  Chambre des Représentants de Belgique, Compte rendu analytique de la reunion publique de Commission de Rela-
tions Extérieures du 5 Juillet 2000, p. 6. 
182  Council of the European Union, ‘User’s Guide to the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports’, updated version, 
Brussels, 18 December 2006, 16440/06, p. 27. 
183  Calls to strengthen the control of small arms exports have come from the EP. In particular in European Parliament, 
‘Report on the Council's Seventh and Eighth Annual Report according to Operative Provision 8 of the European 
Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, 30 November 2006, A6-0439/2006 FINAL, par. 33, the Parliament 
warned about the danger encompassed by the difference between military and non-military arms which can be used 
by arms exporters to bypass the controls. 
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few years, the scarcity of data about small arms both in the national and in the EU export report 
severely limits the monitoring of small arms exports from a human rights perspective.  
A third obstacle seems to be the fact that the small arms Strategy considers small arms principally 
under a “conflict” perspective and not from a “human rights” one. In other words, the few times 
that human rights violations are mentioned with regards to small arms they are considered as an 
outcome of armed conflicts and not also as a consequence of the misuse of small arms in peace 
time184.  
These elements, among others, suggest that there are problems of coordination and coherency be-
tween the policy areas of arms export controls, human rights and small arms initiatives. Picture 5.1 
illustrates this assumption by marking the difference in strength of the links between these three 
policies. 
 
Picture 5.1: the (missing) links between the three EU’s policies 
 
 
In fact, the connection between arms export controls and human rights is the strongest (at least on 
paper) in the EU’s policy action: the arms export control policy acknowledges the impact on hu-
man rights that European weapons may have in third countries, and does so primarily through crite-
rion 2 of the Code of Conduct; from the perspective of the EU human rights policy, on the other 
hand, arms export control has been recognized as an important step of the process to mainstreaming 
human rights.185 European institutions have repeatedly called to strengthen the control and enlarge 
it over a broader range of equipment186.   
The link between arms export controls and small arms appears instead to be less clear. The arms 
export policy lacks of a sufficient attention to small arms, primarily due to the absence of an univo-
cal definition of small arms. The small arms policy, from its side, recognizes that the combat 
against small arms proliferation requires the adoption of restrictive export policies187 and an har-
monised application of the Code188, but is affected by the same shortcomings in the EU defini-
tion.189 Compared to the focus on the illegal trade in small arms and on the destruction of existing 
stockpiles, it does not give sufficient attention to the impact of legal exports to foreign countries.  
                                                     
184  Council of the European Union, ‘EU Strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW and their 
ammunition’, Brussels, 13 January 2006, 5319/06. 
185  Council of the European Union, ‘EU Annual Report on Human Rights 2002’, p. 20. 
186  See for instance the European Parliament Reports and Resolutions on the Annual Report on the implementation of 
the Code, all available on http://www.nisat.org/EU/European%20Parliament/European%20Parliament%20and%20 
Small%20Arms.htm (consulted on 10 July 2007). See also Council of the European Union,  Annual Reports on the 
implementation of the Code, years 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004. 
187  Anders, 2003, p. 5. 
188  Council of the European Union, ‘EU Strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW and their 
ammunition’, Brussels, 13 January 2006, 5319/06. 
189  UNIDIR, 2005, p. 22. 
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The connection between small arms and human rights is probably the weakest one. The EU small 
arms initiatives are almost exclusively focused on conflict prevention and consider small arms pro-
liferation as a threat to stability in third countries rather than a threat to human rights. Similarly 
human rights policy has not given enough importance to small arms outside the context of armed 
conflicts190. A broader consideration has been promoted by the EP, but has not had a tangible im-
pact on these two EU policies191.  
These missing links are a very serious shortcoming of the EU’s approach, especially considering 
that small arms are the weapons the most involved in the violation of human rights. A proper re-
sponse to this threat should elaborate a specific attention to small arms, stronger – if possible – than 
on other conventional arms. The picture that comes out from this analysis, instead, shows that the 
EU is going exactly in the opposite direction.  The huge effort of the EU in the field of human 
rights – all the projects funded through the EIDHR and the implementation of the instruments that 
have been mentioned in paragraph 3.1 – risk being undermined by this loose control over small 
arms exports. Egypt is a strong case in point.  
 
5.2.1 Much efforts for dubious results: the cooperation between the EU and Egypt 
Egypt is good example of how the coordination among the various European policies and the con-
sistency of the member states behaviour with them are far from effective. The EU has a strong co-
operative relationship with Egypt in the area of human rights, both through their bilateral relations 
and within the regional cooperation framework of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership (so called 
Barcelona Process).192 These institutions have been subsequently reinforced by the EU Neighbour-
hood policy193 and the Strategic Partnership for the Mediterranean and the Middle East194. At the 
same time, though, these efforts have been supported neither by strict small arms export controls 
nor by any initiative in the field of the small arms strategy even though a large amount of the hu-
man rights violations reported in Egypt involve the use of small arms. Although the human rights 
situation in the country depends on many other factors, the absence of any progress suggests that 
most of the efforts of the EU have been in vain. 
The human rights situation in Egypt remains severe and is aggravated by the uninterrupted imple-
mentation of the Emergency Law since 1981, which also generated the protests of the EU195. The 
human rights reports consulted196 draw particular attention to, among others, the use of violent 
methods by the police to disperse peaceful demonstrations (often involving killings)197; the arbi-
trary arrest and detention without charge or trial for political opponents and alleged supporters of 
banned Islamist groups (thousands of people remain in detention, some have been held for more 
than a decade); the systematic use of torture and degrading treatment by the police198; and  the re-
course to extrajudicial killings. The means of protection and monitoring of violations of human 
rights are weak and in the majority of torture cases the perpetrators are not brought to justice even 
                                                     
190  Council of the European Union ‘EU Guidelines on Children and armed conflicts’, 15634/03.  
191  European Parliament, ‘Report on the Sixth Annual Report according to Operative Provision 8 of the European 
Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, 12 October 2005, A6-0292/2005 FINAL; ‘Resolution on small arms and 
light weapons’, P6_TA(2005)0204, par. C. 
192  See http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed.  
193  See http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/index_en.htm. 
194  Council of the European Union, Final Report on a EU Strategic Partnership for the Mediterranean and the Middle 
East, June 2004, available via http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Partnership%20Mediterranean%20 
and%20Middle%20East.pdf. 
195  European Commission, Country Report, Egypt, COM(2005) 72 final, p. 7. Moreover a recent reform in the consti-
tution has been deemed to “entrench the long-standing system of abuse under Egypt’s state of emergency powers 
and give the misuse of those powers a bogus legitimacy”. See ‘Egypt: Proposed constitutional amendments greatest 
erosion of human rights in 26 years, 18 March 2007, AI Index: MDE 12/008/2007 (Public), available on 
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGMDE120082007?open&of=ENG-2D3 (consulted on 10 July 2007). 
196  Amnesty International, Annual Reports, 1999-2009, Human Rights Watch, Annual Reports, 2004-2007, US State 
Department, Country Reports, 1999-2007. 
197  Also the EU, in a Presidency Statement of May 2006, expressed its criticism for the harsh treatment of peaceful 
demonstrators, see http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/egypt/intro/index.htm (consulted on 10 July 2007). 
198  As also stated by the UN Committee against Torture, “torture is a frequently used method of interrogation and 
punishment in Egypt, particularly in connection with political and security matters”. Agiza v. Sweden, 
CAT/C/34/D/233/2003, 24 May 2005, par. 3.3. 
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though several UN and EU institutions reproached Egypt for not fully cooperating with interna-
tional human rights mechanisms – including for refusing visits from several UN Special Rappor-
teurs199. 
The EU has acknowledged the gravity of the human rights situation in several Démarches, Declara-
tions and other documents;200 it has concurrently tried to promote progress through the different 
human rights instruments at its disposal. Hence, with in the framework of the Neighbourhood pol-
icy, the EU started a dialogue in 2004 on human rights with Egypt and has financed several pro-
jects in the country through the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights. Moreover, 
the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement of 2001 already included the respect of human 
rights as an essential clause of the partnership201, although it has not been implemented so far202. 
Finally, in March 2007 the EU and Egypt adopted an Action Plan in the framework of the 
Neighbourhood policy designed to support the Egyptian reform agenda. It includes the establish-
ment of eight sub-committees, including one on “Political Issues: Human Rights and Democracy.” 
Almost 600 millions Euros have been budgeted for its implementation203. 
Human rights and democratisation issues in the dialogue with Egypt have witnessed very little ac-
tion beyond the rhetoric and even then only partial successes. As Youngs states, strong security and 
commercial interests prevailed on the EU’s declared holistic approach to democracy promotion in 
the Mediterranean, and the European policy failed to fully adhere to the logic of its own philoso-
phy204.   
According to the aggregate figure derived by Eurostat-Comtrade, in the period 1998-2006 Egypt 
imported over 6,5 million euros of small arms, primarily from Germany and Italy. However, as 
graph 5.2 shows, the amount reported by the national and the European export report are even big-
ger, thus suggesting that the largest portion of exports to Egypt consisted of military equipment205. 
 
                                                     
199  European Commission, Country Report, Egypt, COM(2005) 72 final, p. 10, Amnesty International, Annual Report, 
2007, US Department of State, Country Report, 2006 
200  European Commission, Country Report, Egypt, COM(2005) 72 final, p. 9. Council of the European Union, EU 
Annual Report on Human Rights 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005. 
201  European Commission, ‘Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Com-
munities and their member states, of the one part, and the Arab Republic of Egypt, of the other part’, COM (2001) 
184 final, art. 2. 
202  In more than one occasion the EP called on an implementation of the clause. See for instance European Parliament, 
Resolution on Egypt: Violence against Sudanese refugees, 19 January 2006, P6_TA(2006)0031, par. 12, European 
Parliament, Resolution on the alleged use of European countries by the CIA for the transportation and illegal deten-
tion of prisoners, 14 February 2007, P6_TA-PROV(2007)0032, par. 225, European Parliament, Report on the al-
leged use of European countries by the CIA for the transportation and illegal detention of prisoners, 30 January 
2007, A6-0020/2007, par. 223. 
203  http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/284&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&gui 
Language=en and Schäfer, ‘The EU and Egypt, stability or human rights?’, 2007, in Quantara.de, http://qantara.de/ 
webcom/show_article.php/_c-476/_nr-752/i.html. 
204  Youngs, Gillespie, 2002, p. 41. 
205  Egypt also manufactures the 7.62mm FN MAG under licence from the Belgian firm FN Herstal. See Small Arms 
Survey, 2002, p. 45. 
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Graph 5.2:     Exports of small arms to Egypt 
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Source: Eurostat, UN Comtrade, German export report, EU Annual Report 
Notes : (a) the German Report and the EU Annual Report only cover, respectively, the period 2002-2005 and 
2003-2005. 
 
A full understanding of the reasons for the high amount of 2003-2004 should take into considera-
tion other factors such as the demand side. Nonetheless, even though the exports have dropped 
after 2004, the flows are still higher than the pre-2002 level. 
This is not determined by the “wrong” behaviour of member states and their non-compliance with 
the provisions of the Code alone. Conversely, the picture is more complex and reflects the lack of 
coordination of the three EU policies. Arms export controls and small arms programs, in fact, are 
not seen as a necessary complement for the realisation of the objectives in the field of human 
rights. The EU has never stated that the export of arms to Egypt (and North Africa in general) may 
constitute a threat to the respect of human rights, and has only addressed this question with regard 
to security reasons, organized crime, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction206 or referring to 
the illegal trade in arms207. This, unfortunately, clearly contradicts the EU’s own commitment in 
promoting progress with respect to human rights and underestimates the systematic involvement of 
small arms in the most serious violations occurring in Egypt. While close attention to small arms 
export is lacking, the UNIDIR 2005 Report on the EU Strategy on Small Arms has highlighted that 
an enhanced European action on small arms in North Africa is as a necessary complement in order 
for peace and security as endorsed by the Barcelona Process to be realized208.  
 
5.3 Strengthening the ties with Pakistan: the mix of conflicting priorities 
The case studies analysed above – Saudi Arabia and Egypt – have been taken as examples of two 
different aspects explaining the ineffectiveness of the small arms export controls, notably the 
prevalence of foreign policy interests over human rights concern and the lack of coherency between 
the three EU policy sectors involved in this matter. 
These two elements have been considered separately in the analysis for sake of clarity. In reality, 
though, as the case of Egypt itself already suggested, it is difficult to distinguish exactly where one 
ends and the other begins to play. If the EU is not clear enough in implementing its own policies, 
member states certainly take advantage of these missing links in order to pursue their own foreign 
                                                     
206  Barcelona Declaration, adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 27-28 November 1995. 
207  European Commission, Communication on the European Neighbourhood Policy, Strategy Paper , COM(2004) 373 
final, p. 13. 
208  UNIDIR, 2005, p. 39. 
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policy interests209. Pakistan, to look at a third case, is in this sense a good example of how a rather 
structured but not coordinated cooperation in the field of human rights goes together with an 
emerging importance of strategic factors.  
Although the regional cooperation framework with the South Asian Association for Regional Co-
operation (SAARC) is less structured than with the Mediterranean partners210, the EU has been 
more active in the field of human rights here than, for instance, with Saudi Arabia. At the same 
time, the strategic importance of Pakistan has recently increased: the boost of Islamic Fundamental-
ism in the region has turned into a matter of security for the EU as well, and it is likely to have 
necessitated at least “indirect support” to the Pakistani regime in its fight against terrorism. If this 
assumption is correct, it can explain why the export of small arms had been minimal or not existent 
until 2004, and why they have increased significantly since then. 
Violations of human rights are widespread and severe, especially after General Pervez Musharraf 
took power in a military takeover in 1999. Small arms have been particularly involved in extrajudi-
cial killings, including political rivals, disappearances of provincial activists and political oppo-
nents, as well as arbitrary arrest and torture211. Likewise, civil and political rights suffer serious 
restrictions and not even Pakistan has ratified the ICCPR. Moreover the ready availability of small 
arms has increased the intensity of violence perpetuated against and between all communities and 
groups212. 
While expressing its concern for this situation213, the EU has increased its commitment to promot-
ing respect for human rights in Pakistan. The EU-Pakistan cooperation agreement includes a clause 
related to the commitment of both partners to human rights214, and the EU Head of Mission con-
ducts a regular dialogue on human rights with the Government of Pakistan focusing on the misuse 
of the blasphemy laws, violence against women, minority rights, police behaviour, torture, the 
death penalty, and freedom of expression215. Moreover several projects in the field of police behav-
iour, rule of law, illicit traffic in arms, strengthening the role of civil society have been financed 
through the EIDHR.216 In a joint declaration in February 2007, the EU and Pakistan went on to 
stress their reciprocal interest for strengthening their cooperation in human rights field217. 
Notwithstanding these efforts, small arms flows have increased in the recent years even if the 
human rights crisis has generally become more severe – they accounted for almost seven million 
Euros only in the last three years.218 Even still, this region has not been a priority for the EU’s small 
arms assistance and found little attention in the EU 2005 Small Arms Strategy219. The high amount 
of flows reported by the EU annual report suggests that the equipment has been in large part of a 
“military” nature, and thus in accordance with the political situation so sketched.  
 
                                                     
209  In 2004, for instance, the Italian government defended its exports to Algeria by referring to the fact the EU has not 
condemned Algeria for its violations of human rights. See Luigi Mantica, undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, re-
ported by Amnesty International Italia, http://www.amnesty.it/campagne/controlarms/documenti/g8/italia.html. 
210  European Commission, Strategy Paper and Indicative Programme for Multi-Country Programmes in Asia 2005-
2006, p. 6. Available via http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/asia/rsp/rsp_asia.pdf (consulted on 19 July 2007). 
211  US State Department, 2007. Only in 2006, for instance, have been reported 1,513 cases of torture in custody by 
security force personnel. 
212  Banerjee, Muggah, 2002, p. 27. 
213  Council of the European Union, Annual Reports on Human Rights, years 2001, 2002, 2003 , 2004, 2005. 
214  European Commission, ‘Cooperation agreement between the European Community and the Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan on partnership and development’, available on http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/pakistan/intro/coop_ 
agree_11_01.pdf (consulted on 10 July 2007). 
215  Council of the European Union, Annual Reports on Human Rights 2005. 
216  Council of the European Union, Annual Reports on Human Rights, 2001, 2002, 2003 , 2004, 2005. 
217  Council of the European Union, EU-Pakistan Joint Declaration, Brussels, 8 February 2007, 6174/07 (Presse 21). 
218  Pakistan also manufactures arms and ammunition under licence from the German firm Heckler & Koch. See Small 
Arms Survey, 2002, p. 50. 
219  In fact, the UNIDIR recently called the EU to give Asia more attention in its small arms action (UNIDIR, 2005, p. 
42). 
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Graph 5.3:     Exports of small arms to Pakistan 
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Source: Eurostat, UN Comtrade, German export report, EU Annual Report 
Notes : (a) the German Report and the EU Annual Report only cover, respectively, the period 2002-2005 and 
2003-2005. 
 
This reflects the assumption that the exports have been primarily driven by foreign policy interests 
and that the Code has not been properly applied. As a direct consequence, it follows that the action 
of the EU in promoting, for instance, police behaviour might have been undermined by an uncon-
trolled proliferation of small arms and by the political support to the regime that the trade in arms 
represents.  
In general, the lack of coordination between different policies, along with the difference between 
the EU rhetoric and the real behaviour of member states, is likely to limit the effectiveness of the 
EU’s promotion of human rights in foreign countries. On a very direct level, the export of small 
arms openly conflicts with the efforts of the EU in the field of human rights and democracy. Also, 
where the EU’s efforts are more sustained, as in the case of the Mediterranean countries, the EU’s 
commitment (also in terms of financial assistance) in areas such as the rule of law, police behaviour 
or political reforms220 can be undermined by the simple proliferation of small arms. Confirmation 
that the discord of these policies deprives the action of promoting human rights of an important 
support has also come from the European Parliament. It has stressed that “on several occasions EU 
human rights policies have been undermined by (…) Member States not maintaining systematically 
a strict application of the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports” and emphasised that “firm politi-
cal action against the proliferation of all types of weapons, both conventional and WMD, both 
heavy arms and light weapons, is essential to the success of any EU campaign on human rights”221. 
On a political level, moreover, this lack of coherency generates contradictory messages which may 
seriously damage the credibility of the EU’s commitment in promoting human rights. While this 
problem concerns many different mechanisms of the EU’s promotion of human rights and primar-
ily the effective use of the human rights clauses contained in the cooperation agreements, the con-
tradictory messages sent by the member states and their significant autonomy in setting export pol-
icy give authoritarian regimes many reasons and opportunities to disregard human rights conditions 
set by the EU. In other words, without ensuring that the diverse range of European external actions 
is pursued in a coherent manner with an overarching strategy, the EU efforts for the promotion of 
human rights may turn out to be very costly and ineffective in the long run. 
                                                     
220  See for instance EU-Egypt Association Council, ‘EU-Egypt Joint Action Plan’, 6 March 2007. 
221  European Parliament, ‘Resolution on human rights in the world in 2003 and the European Union's policy on the 
matter’, 22 April 2004, P5_TA(2004)0376, paragraph 30. 
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6. Conclusions and Recommendations  
 
The aim of this study was to assess the effectiveness of criterion 2 of the Code of Conduct in curb-
ing the European export of small arms to countries which violate human rights. In the spirit of ad-
vancing public policy, a brief review of the findings will help illuminate possible solutions to the 
most significant problems identified. 
 
Main Findings  
 
• The lack of comprehensive and detailed data on small arms severely limits the monitoring of 
small arms exports from a human rights perspective. Without data there is no means of control 
or enforcement.  
The European Annual Report is very poor in data regarding small arms exports. The same is true 
for national export reports (with the partial exception of Germany), while the other sources avail-
able (Eurostat, Comtrade) do not constitute valuable alternatives to fully observe export trends in 
small arms because they mainly provide data about non-military exports. The fact that data are 
missing, especially with regards to small arms, is of particular concern.  
 
• The export controls are not working efficiently. Other priorities influence the exports. 
The analysis showed that there has not been a clear effect of the Code and that the trend of export 
could be better explained primarily in terms of bilateral relations, strategic importance of the re-
cipient country, and national interpretation of the provisions of criterion 2 of the Code. As a result, 
most of the countries of concern have kept their traditional flows and in some cases even increased 
them. In general, the recognition of a country in violation of human rights standards is highly de-
pendant on the political, strategic and commercial interests of the EU and of the member states. To 
answer the question posed in the introduction: reality in the field of arms export control is still far 
from the rhetoric, and the real challenges prevail over the theoretical framework. 
 
• The Middle East, and in particular the Gulf region, resulted to be the largest recipient area 
among the countries considered.  
 
• Member states neither comply with the provisions of the Code nor are they obliged to by the 
current framework.  
 
The Code is just a political document and any decision, eventually, is taken autonomously by each 
state. By being not legally binding, there is no mechanism of enforcement. 
 
• A significant portion of the exports consisted of non-military equipment.  
Export to countries of concern included also small arms classified under the category of non mili-
tary weapons (which falls outside the current scope of the Code), in particular in the case of Bel-
gium. This suggests that the actual framework is inadequate to address properly the problem of 
proliferation of small arms and violations of human rights, the solution of which passes also 
through the acknowledgment that civil equipment can be as dangerous as military one in the re-
pression of fundamental rights. 
 
• The lack of a univocal definition of small arms constitutes one of the biggest threats to the ef-
fectiveness of export controls and to the protection of human rights.  
First, the definitions used by the three exporters and the one adopted by the EU differ. Second, all 
of them fall short of the definition proposed by the 1997 UN Panel of experts. In the case of the 
EU, the definition is limited to those arms and accessories specifically designed for military use 
and it omits those weapons used by law enforcement agencies. The export of police equipment 
therefore falls outside the definition of small arms and even the scope of the Code. Moreover, the 
Common Military List does not reflect the definition of the 1998 Joint Action, the result being that 
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the weapons entailed by the Joint Action are mixed with other arms in the categories ML1, ML2, 
ML3. 
 
• The EU’s policies on the promotion of human rights, on arms export controls and on small 
arms are not enough coordinated and integrated 
Recent studies show that the Code had an effect in curbing the European arms exports to countries 
with very low human rights records. Nonetheless, this study, in line with other recent works, finds 
that this effect is not clear with regards to small arms. This study considers that this is partly due to 
the fact that the three policies concerned (human rights, arms export control, small arms) are not 
well coordinated and integrated. The intersection between the three policy sectors, which could be 
a point of strength of the EU action, appears to be instead a point of weakness. In particular: 
- the arms export control policy does not give enough attention to the issue of small arms; 
- the initiatives undertaken in the framework of the Small Arms Strategy are mainly focused on 
conflict prevention, illegal trade and destruction of existing stockpiles, while they are less 
cognisant of the impact of legal exports to the human rights situation of third countries; 
- Even where the EU action for human rights is stronger and more articulated (e.g. in the frame-
work of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership), the arms export controls and small arms pro-
grams are not seen as a necessary complement for the realisation of the objectives.  
 
• The export of small arms to countries which violate human rights undermines the efforts of the 
EU in promoting democracy and the respect for human rights in the world.  
The low level of coordination of the three policies mentioned above generates contradictory mes-
sages and creates what can be called a sort of schizophrenia, whereby the EU is taking action in 
one direction while the member states are undermining its action. These contradictory messages 
and decisions openly conflict with the efforts of the EU in the field of human rights and democracy 
and with the principles of the European Security Strategy, and they weaken the programmes of the 
EU in contrasting small arms proliferation. The risk, therefore, is to reduce the positive condition-
ality that the EU is seeking in its external action and to undermine the effectiveness of the EU pro-
motion of human rights in third countries.  
 
 
Recommendations 
 
• There is a need for greater transparency. Data availability should be enhanced through more 
efficient and compulsory data records.  
Member states should publish transparent information about small arms in the national and the 
European report. In particular, they should report the data disaggregated by category and recipient 
country at the same time. Meanwhile member states should commit themselves to communicate all 
small arms exports, including military exports, to customs authorities. A reform of the reporting 
system (thus of operative provision 8) which makes communication of the data disaggregated by 
category and recipient countries compulsory may be more easily achievable than making the whole 
Code of Conduct legally binding. In fact, while in principle the simple disclosure of information 
sensible to the essential interests of a member state is protected by Art. 296 of the TEU, this may 
be considered a good compromise by member states between the current situation and a full revi-
sion of the Code.  
It is true that the accuracy of the German report does not prevent this country to export small arms 
to countries which this study considered clearly in breach of the most basic respect of human 
rights. Nonetheless, the German report is more transparent and therefore conducive to inquiry, as in 
the case of this paper, that can systematically address anomalies that emerge. Obviously, it would 
be very important to be able to do the same with other European exporters such as Italy and Bel-
gium.  
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• A more inclusive definition of small arms is urgently needed at the European level. The defini-
tion, in particular, has to include also those items of non-military equipment which are rele-
vant to major human rights violations. 
The EU should recognise that the current definition of small arms is inadequate to properly address 
the problem of proliferation of small arms and violations of human rights. The solution requires 
that policy makers acknowledge that civilian equipment can be as dangerous as military equipment 
in the repression of fundamental rights. Together with the elaboration of a new definition, perhaps 
adopted as an update of the small arms Strategy, the categories of the CML should be reviewed in 
order to make the change operative in the practical impact of the Code.  
Commenting on this proposal, the vice-president of the EP Luisa Morgantini said that “the EP may 
push for a re-definition of small arms through a resolution calling for a reaction of the international 
community”222, while Ernst Guelcher seemed convinced that the EP can “push for a definition to 
include the controversial elements in the small arms issue” but also stressed that unfortunately 
“there is no good definition because all elements of such definition are the outcome of political 
interests”223.  
 
• A crucial improvement would be the adoption of a legally binding document which would 
strengthen the influence of the EU over the member states in the field of arms exports and set 
up a mechanism to investigate the alleged violations of the Code. 
This will not only assure the compliance of the national export policies with the European criteria, 
but will also guarantee more consistency with the EU promotion of human rights in foreign coun-
tries. This reform has both political and legal obstacles, the latter mainly existing in article 296 of 
the TUE. Even assuming that a reform will be achieved, much will depend on the kind of change 
that such a reform will introduce. The ineffectiveness of the controls is not only due to its non bind-
ing nature, but also to other loopholes, primarily the discretion that states have found in the defini-
tion of small arms. A recent study proved that member states have shown only partial compliance 
even with regards to legally binding EU arms embargoes, thus suggesting that not everything can 
be solved by a binding document224. Moreover, it should be clear to the member states that, in the 
process of negotiating such a document, its full effectiveness would eventually depend on giving 
the Union – and not the member states – the competence and the final word about the licence au-
thorisation/denials. 
 
• The EU should compliment its action on human rights issues with efforts in other policies ar-
eas, including arms export controls.  
The process of mainstreaming is severely handicapped if other policies such as arms exports do not 
support the efforts of the EU. This much has even been recognized by the EP on many occasions. 
Especially in areas such as the Mediterranean, the EU should acknowledge that conditionality in 
arms exports can enhance rather than diminish its influence over human rights issues. In this re-
gard, future research should analyze whether some correlation exists between the effectiveness of 
EU programs in the field of human rights and the amount of arms flows to specific region and 
country. Similar considerations could be executed as well with regard to the correlation between 
exports of small arms and the effectiveness of non-proliferation programs undertaken within the 
small arms strategy. 
 
• The EU should acknowledge the missing links between human rights, arms export controls and 
the small arms policy and it should work to enhance the coordination among them. 
Further research is needed to identify potential solutions and suggest how to restructure the interac-
tion between these three policies, but it is possible to indicate at least the main directions that the 
EU should undertake.  
                                                     
222  E-mail from Luisa Morgantini, vice-president of the European Parliament, 5 July 2007. 
223  E-mail from Ernst Guelcher, Green/EFA advisor on security and defence at the European Parliament, 3 July 2007. 
224  Jackson, Marsh, Thurin, 2005, pp. 56-73. 
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The small arms strategy should be reviewed and should consider human rights violations as a cen-
tral issue, also on the operative ground. Projects funded within the Small Arms Strategy can be 
efficiently integrated with existing projects of the EIDHR, thus generating joint initiatives which 
cut across the two policies and exploit the action-oriented nature of these two programs. On the 
other hand, arms export controls should be more aware of the specific danger of small arms for 
human rights violations and, as already said, adopt a broader definition of small arms and reform 
consequently the CML. Third, this stronger engagement in the field of small arms export controls 
should not be seen as a policy isolated from the others. Conversely, it can be only one component 
of a stronger and more effective action of the EU in the field of human rights. 
 
• To push for the necessary steps in terms of coordination and transparency, greater institution-
alisation of mechanisms addressing the export of small arms to countries which violate human 
rights may be helpful.  
In this sense the role of the Personal Representative for Human Rights of the High Representative 
of the EU for the CFSP and the Personal Representative for non-proliferation (who is also respon-
sible for the implementation of the EU Small Arms Strategy and for the coordination of the na-
tional controls of arms export) may be important. Their cooperation on this issue may lead to con-
crete proposal and to a better coordination of action between the promotion of human rights, the 
arms export controls and the small arms strategy. They could also think about the appointment of a 
figure who could have competencies across these fields and who could work specifically on the 
harmonisation of these policies at the European level, perhaps on the model of the “UN Special 
Rapporteur on the prevention of human rights violations committed with small arms”.  
Similarly, important pressures may come from the European Parliament, which so far has been the 
most astute actor involving these issues and has already stressed in its exchange of views with the 
Commission and the Council the need for more policy coherence. Besides continuing in the role of 
a watchdog among the European institutions, the Parliament may also think of appointing a work-
ing group on the prevention of human rights violations committed with small arms in order to study 
and elaborate possible reform in this sense.  
These proposals have been forwarded and discussed with some members of the EP and received a 
rather positive feedback. In particular Luisa Morgantini strongly agreed on the “need for a greater 
institutionalisation of the problem in order to give more transparency and coherence between the 
behaviour of the EU and the member states. Many member states, in fact, take advantage of the 
lack of attention on this matter to keep selling arms to states which violate human rights”225. She 
found interesting the proposal of appointing a special Rapporteur, stressing at the same time the 
“need to start a constant coordination at all levels among the all the Directorates-General (DG) of 
the Commission and in particular DG Trade and DG Development”226. She also received with in-
terest the proposal of creating a working group of the EP, suggesting that there is room to promote 
also other initiatives such as resolution and reports and to involve more the Commission and the 
Council in the EP debates on this issue. Also Ernst Guelcher received the appointment of a Special 
Rapporteur as a “good idea, as long as it is recognised that the issue of arms exports is not only 
linked to human rights issues”227. Concerning the role of the EP, he stressed that “only since re-
cently the EP has a bit more access to what is discussed in the COARM, but so far we still have 
very little real impact in the field of implementation, in particular not as far as this is at the compe-
tence-level of national states”228. Therefore on paper, he said, the establishment of a working group 
of the EP is a good idea, but it is not sure if that would really improve the work and the impact of 
the parliament.  
 
 
 
                                                     
225  E-mail from Luisa Morgantini, vice-president of the European Parliament, 5 July 2007. 
226  Ibid. 
227  E-mail from Ernst Guelcher, Green/EFA advisor on security and defence at the European Parliament, 3 July 2007. 
228  Ibid. 
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• In order to make these reforms really effective and to reduce the perception that it will be ex-
tremely costly for the EU defence industry, it is necessary to involve the other main producers 
and exporters of small arms in this process. The success of the negotiation of an Arms Trade 
Treaty, therefore, should be a primary concern of the EU.  
 
Several reasons suggest that if the EU plays alone, it will turn out into a very costly policy which 
will not have a definite impact on the proliferation on small arms around the world. In fact, other 
major exporter countries (USA, Russia, China) are ready to take over the place of European coun-
tries in providing countries of concern with small arms. Such a policy would be both ineffective 
and would only result in an economic loss for the European defence industry. Certainly, this would 
not be acceptable by any national government. It is therefore necessary to promote stricter arms 
export control in the international arena. Both member states and the EU have already undertaken 
steps in this sense, primarily by actively supporting the negotiations of an Arms Trade Treaty.  
The EU, in particular, should act in two directions. On the one hand it should use all its political 
weight to involve the other major exporters in this process, which so far have opposed any progress 
– especially the USA, Russia and China. However, even without these actors involved, a good and 
representative core group of nations who accede to the treaty can actually push the others into the 
process by convincing, shaming and blaming them. On the other hand, this study showed that the 
EU controls, which are considered the most advanced framework in the world, still allowed export 
to countries which violate human rights. While advocating an international treaty, therefore, the EU 
should be fully aware of the loopholes of its framework and should encourage more far reaching 
solutions at international level. In this respect, the findings of this study can be a useful guide. 
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